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The Constitution brought about fundamental changes to the structure of government in 
South Africa. The national, provincial and local spheres of government are defined as 
being distinctive, interdependent and interrelated. Each sphere is obliged to exercise 
their powers and perform their functions in a manner that does not encroach on the 
geographical, functional or institutional integrity of government in another sphere and 
in addition must not assume any power or function except those conferred on them in 
terms of the Constitution. The areas for which each sphere has executive and legislative 
powers are assigned in Schedules 4 and 5 of the Constitution. This is done through the 
use of functional areas.  
 
In the context of environmental law, the allocation of these functional areas is a 
minefield of potential conflict between the spheres of government. As such, defining 
the scope of the functional areas, and establishing principles in terms of which the 
spheres of government exercise their constitutionally protected powers is an important 
issue. This is highlighted in the case of conflict arising between the functional areas of 
municipal planning (a local government functional area) and environment (a national 
and provincial functional area). This planning-environment conflict has lead to a range 
of recent judgments that appear to have crystallised the principles in terms of which the 
Constitution should be viewed as allocating the functional areas. A key principle is that 
the three spheres of government should not been seen as having been placed in 
hermetically sealed compartments and that sometimes the exercise of powers by two 
spheres may result in an overlap. When this happens, neither sphere should been seen 
as intruding into the functional area of another. Each sphere would be exercising power 
within its own competence. 
 
Therefore, it is apparent that local government has been saddled with a significant 
amount of powers to regulate environmental-issues through planning legislation. Whilst 
this may be appropriate in certain circumstance, the courts must be wary of allowing 
too broad an interpretation of local functional areas where this would erode into the 
functional area of environment. In order to further environmental governance, 
v 
 
alternative means of defining the functional areas should be adopted. Such alternate 
means include legislative interpretation, administrative definitions and negotiated 
definitions. Within this suite of tools, giving effect to the Constitution through effective 
environmental governance at each sphere of government is achievable.
vi 
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Environmental governance is a good example of an instance where all three 
spheres of government are required to establish and enforce legislative 
measures pertaining to a single and shared subject matter – namely, the 
environment. The competency to oversee matters that relate to the environment 
is thus shared between the different spheres on the basis that each sphere is 
responsible for the particular governance that best suits its structure, resources, 




The management and protection of the environment is a remarkably complex task, 
which is complicated by a variety of factors ranging from defining what is meant by the 
word 'environment',
3
 to the allocation of sufficient resources to effectively implement 
legislation and policy (be it personnel, financial or scientific), to the (often) conflicting 
demands of development versus environmental protection. Against this background it is 
not difficult to understand why the legal regulation of matters affecting the environment 
is inherently a difficult subject matter for any government. In South Africa, 
environmental governance is even further complicated due to the unusual
4
 structure of 





Bray, discussing the Interim Constitution,
6
 notes that the 'federal elements of the 
constitutional structure [...] may cause far-reaching consequences for the development 
of a cohesive system of environmental law and environmental management'. The 
'federal elements' to which Bray refers were retained in the (final) Constitution. A 
review of our case authority tends to suggest that Bray was correct in the assertion. 
                                               
1 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, as amended (hereinafter referred to as the 
Constitution). 
2 C Bosmam, L Kotze and W Du Plessis 'The failure of the Constitution to ensure integrated 
environmental management from a co-operative governance perspective' (2004) 19 (2) SAPR/PL at 413 
3 See J Glazewski 'The Nature and Scope of Environmental Law' in J Glazewski and L du Toit (eds) 
Environmental Law in South Africa (2013) 1-11 – 1-12. 
4 Although not unique to South Africa, there are relatively few governments that adopt what can be 
described as a federalist approach to governance. 
5 The Constitution. 
6 Act 200 of 1993. 
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Indeed, the constitutional structure of government, the division of powers between the 
spheres of government, and the principles in terms of which such spheres are meant to 
co-operate are unclear and often contradictory. This is especially true in respect of the 
functional area of 'municipal planning' vis-à-vis the functional area of 'environment'. 
This area of conflict has given rise to a series of important cases that have crystallised 
the manner in which functional areas should be interpreted. 
 
Bray in examining the division of legislative competences relating to the environment, 
goes on to suggest that 'the enactment, normative hierarchy, implementation and 
enforcement of environmental law will be determined by the constitutional structure of 
the state.'
7
 This statement clearly indicates the importance of the constitutional structure 
of the state as it relates to environmental governance. Therefore, it is important to 
formalise the manner in which the three spheres of government perceive the extent of 
their environment-related legislative and executive powers as prescribed in the 
Constitution. The constitutional division of powers and the principles in terms of which 
the spheres of government must operate are therefore critical to environmental law. 
 
One of the fundamental structural components of government established in terms of 
the Constitution is the division of the government into three spheres. These spheres 
consist of a national, provincial and local sphere of government.
8
 The Constitution 
assigns to each sphere of government specific administrative and legislative 
competences. A characteristic of this multi-sphere government is that original 
legislative authority vests in each sphere.
9
 The empowering provisions in terms of 
which the legislative authority of each sphere of government is set out are found at 




Section 156(1) of the Constitution provides that a municipality has the executive 
authority in respect of, and has the right to administer the local government matters 
listed in Part B of Schedule 4 and Part B of Schedule 5 of the Constitution. In addition, 
municipalities have executive authority in respect of, and the right to administer any 
                                               
7 E Bray 'Fragmentation of the environment: another opportunity lost for a nationally coordinated 
approach?' (1995) 10 SARP/PL at 173 
8 The Constitution; s 40(1). 
9 DW Freedman 'Constitutional law: Structures of government' in WA Joubert (ed) LAWSA 2nd ed 
Replacement Volume (2012) Vol 5(3) at para 57. 
10 In respect of the national, provincial and local spheres, respectively. 
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other matter assigned to it by national or provincial legislation. In terms of section 
156(2), a municipality may make and administer by-laws for the effective 
administration of the matters which it has the right to administer. Therefore, local 
government is assigned the authority to legislate in respect of any of the matters 
provided for at section 156(1). One such functional area included at Part B of Schedule 
4 is that of 'municipal planning'. 
 
Therefore, local government is entitled to exercise legislative and administrative 
authority in respect of, inter alia, 'municipal planning'. Such authority must be 
exercised in accordance with the principles set out in the Constitution. Such principles 
include respecting the constitutional status, institutions, powers and functions of 
government in the other spheres;
11
 not assuming any power or function except those 
conferred on it in terms of the Constitution;
12
 and exercising its powers and performing 
its functions in a manner that does not encroach on the geographical, functional or 
institutional integrity of government in another sphere.
13
 These principles are designed 
to promote co-operation and co-ordination between the spheres of government in order 
to avoid conflict.
14
 Given the supremacy of the Constitution, which essentially means 
that any law or conduct inconsistent with it is invalid,
15
 it is important to ensure that the 
spheres of government respect these constitutional principles. However, in order to 
ensure that the different spheres do not encroach onto the powers and functions of 
another sphere, it is necessary for the functional areas to be clearly defined. This should 
ensure that the appropriate sphere of government is achieving its constitutional mandate 
to govern within its functional areas. 
 
The Constitution does not define the functional areas and so alternate means to define 
the functional areas need to be investigated. Largely, it has fallen to the courts to 
determine the boundaries of the functional areas. However, such matters only reach the 
courts where an incident of alleged encroachment gives rise to conflict that is 
justiciable. From an environmental perspective, 'municipal planning' has been the 
functional area that has contributed most to establishing firm principles in terms of 
                                               
11 The Constitution; s 41(1)(e) 
12 The Constitution; s 41(1)(f) 
13 The Constitution; s 41(1)(g) 
14 DW Freedman op. cit. n9 at para 60. 
15 The Constitution; ss 1(c) and 2 
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which functional areas should be defined and how the spheres of government are meant 
to co-operate. In particular, the landmark decision of the Constitutional Court in the 
Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Gauteng Development Tribunal and others 
case
16
 provided a great deal of clarity on the manner in which 'municipal planning' 
should be defined. This case, as well as several other subsequent cases, have 
crystallised the understanding that local government is entitled to legislate in respect of 
environment-related matters, to the extent that this is necessary and falls within the 
scope of 'municipal planning'. 
 
However, it is not clear whether such a definition of 'municipal planning' is appropriate 
given the prima facie nature of several of the other functional areas; specifically 
'disaster management', 'environment', 'nature conservation, excluding national parks, 
national botanical gardens and marine resources', 'pollution control', 'regional planning 
and development', 'soil conservation'
17
 and 'provincial planning'.
18
 This is particularly 
problematic in that the courts have generally shied away from defining functional areas, 
and when forced to do so, have adopted a 'bottom-up'
19
 approach to interpretation, 
which it will be shown can lead to untenable implications. 
 
In light of this, three key inter-related questions arise. First, how have the courts 
defined the functional areas listed in the Constitution? Second, in light of the 
constitutional principles, the nature of the environment and the current suite of 
environmental legislation, are these definitions (and the manner in which the Court has 
arrived at them) appropriate? Third, what are the implications of attributing such 
definitions to these functional areas? 
 
In order to answer these questions, this paper will discuss the manner in which the 
Constitution has established the government of South Africa and assigned to each 
sphere specific competences. Focusing specifically on the local sphere of government, 
it will be shown how a suite of national legislation has sought to define and regulate the 
role that local government is meant to play. Following this, the manner in which the 
courts have provided judicial definitions to the functional areas will be anaylsed and 
                                               
16 2010 (6) SA 182 (CC). 
17 The Constitution; Schedule 4 Part A. 
18 The Constitution; Schedule 5 Part A. 
19 DW Freedman op. cit. n9 at para 224. 
5 
 
discussed, highlighting the limited role judicial interpretation has in achieving optimal 
environmental governance. Thereafter, the principles in terms of which the spheres of 
government are meant to co-operate will be discussed, showing that alternate means of 
defining the functional areas exist and that adopting these alternate means would assist 
in achieving the distinct, interdependent and inter-related government that was created 
in terms of the Constitution and would provide a greater deal of clarity to each sphere 




2. STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT 
2.1. Pre-Constitutional government 
Prior to the dawn of democracy and the formulation of the Constitution, South Africa 
was governed by a system of government that was centralised around the national level 
of government. In addition to the national level there also existed a provincial level and 
a local level of government, which together formed the pre-constitutional structure of 
government. It is appropriate to refer to this pre-constitutional structure of government 
as a 3-level hierarchy. In this hierarchical system, each level was directly inferior to the 
level(s) above it
20
 and therefore the only level that had any real independence was the 
national level. 
 
The national level of government, through the national parliament, was vested with the 
vast majority of law making powers. The administrative powers that related to the 
implementation of these laws were then divided between the different government 
departments at both the national and provincial levels of government.
21
 In some 
instances, the provincial level of government was also vested with legislative power, 
such as in respect of the regulation of nature conservation, which at the time was 
primarily concerned with the preservation of fish and game species. This narrow 
concept of environmental conservation bears little resemblance to the broad concept of 
environmental conservation that exists in our statute books today. Even though the pre-
constitutional structure of government, characterised as a 3-level hierarchy, centralised 
the majority of law-making powers in the national government, the responsibility to 





Under this system, local government was strictly a subordinate level of government. 
The pre-constitutional local government was vested only with 'prescribed, controlled 
governmental powers.'
23
 Van Wyk describes the pre-constitutional local government as 
being an 'administrative phenomenon, and agent of the provincial government designed 
                                               
20 DW Freedman op. cit. n9 at para 203. 
21 C Loots 'Distribution of responsibility for environmental protection' (1996) 3 SAJELP 81. 
22 Ibid. at 81-82. 
23 DW Freedman op. cit. n9 at para 203. 
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to implement apartheid policy.'
24
 The significance of this is more than just of historical 
interest, as the local government established in terms of the Constitution has inherited 
and has to deal with many of the structures and laws that re-enforced the subordinate 
nature of local government at the time. As stated by Cameron JA in the majority 





[u]nder the preconstitutional dispensation, municipalities owed their existence 
to and derived their powers from provincial ordinances […that] were passed by 
provincial legislatures which themselves had limited law-making authority, 




Therefore, it is evident that local government, despite being a separate level within the 
system of government, was not empowered to exercise any legislative or administrative 
independence. The functioning of this system of government is aptly described in the 
CDA Boerdery case: 
 
[p]arliament’s lawmaking power was untrammeled, and it could determine 
how much legislative power provinces exercised. The provinces in turn could 
largely determine the powers and capacities of local authorities. Municipalities 
were, therefore, at the bottom of a hierarchy of lawmaking power: 




In terms of this hierarchical system, planning and environmental conservation were 
regulated at the national and provincial levels of government, and any competence that 
the local sphere had in terms of such areas was limited to what had been specifically 
assigned by the national or provincial government. 
2.2. Government in terms of the Interim Constitution 
With the dawn of the constitutional dispensation, the system of government in South 
Africa, and in particular the local government level, underwent a 'formal and 
                                               
24 Van Wyk J 'Local Government' in WA Joubert (ed) LAWSA 2nd ed (2008) Vol 15(1) at para 4. 
25 2007 4 SA 276 (SCA). 






 As noted above, prior to the adoption of the Interim 
Constitution, local authorities were seen as being creatures of statute, and were entirely 
subject to provincial government's control.
29
 The Interim Constitution was meant to 
operate for a limited time by establishing the necessary conditions for democratic 
elections and to administer the newly-democratic South Africa.
30
 Similarly to the final 
Constitution, national, provincial and local government were assigned legislative and 
executive competences in respect of listed functional areas. It is not necessary to 
discuss the operation of the Interim Construction in any great detail; it  suffices to note 
that the system of government that is familiar today was first borne through the 
operation of the Interim Constitution. 
2.3. Government in terms of the (final) Constitution 
The Constitution was promulgated on 18 December 1996 and came into effect on 4 
February 1997. Chapter 3 of the Constitution is headed 'Co-operative Government' and 
deals with the structure and functioning of the democratic South African state. The 
foundation for the structure of the government is provided for at section 40, which 
states: 
 
(1) In the Republic, government is constituted as national, provincial and 
local spheres of government which are distinctive, interdependent and 
interrelated. 
(2) All spheres of government must observe and adhere to the principles in 
this Chapter and must conduct their activities within the parameters 




Section 40 incorporates three important elements that characterise the government 
system of South Africa. The first element is a structural element in terms of which three 
spheres of government are established, namely the national, provincial and local 
spheres. The use of the term 'sphere' as opposed to the previously used term 'level' 
reflects the intention to move away from the hierarchical relationship that existed 
                                               
28 N Steytler & J de Visser 'Chapter 22: Local Government' in S Woolman et al (eds) CLOSA 2ed (RS4 
2012) Vol.2, p22-1. 
29 Ibid. 
30 S Woolman & J Swanepoel 'Chapter 2: Constitutional History' in S Woolman et al (eds) CLOSA 2ed 
(RS4 2012) Vol.1 at 2-39 
31 The Constitution; s 40. 
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between the national, provincial and local government.
32
 The second element is a 
descriptive element in terms of which the 3 spheres of government are described as 
being distinctive, interdependent and interrelated. It will be shown that this element 
plays a crucial role in defining the boundaries of the functional areas assigned to each 
sphere. The Constitutional Court in Independent Electoral Commission v Langeberg 
Municipality,
33
 described the meaning of this descriptive element, stating: 
 
[a]ll the spheres are interdependent and interrelated in the sense that the 
functional areas allocated to each sphere cannot be seen in isolation of each 
other. They are all interrelated. None of these spheres of government nor any 
of the governments within each sphere have any independence from each 
other. Their interrelatedness and interdependence is such that they must ensure 
that while they do not tread on each other's toes, they understand that all of 
them perform governmental functions for the benefit of the people of the 




Freedman notes that 'the Constitutional Court has explained that [this] phrase confirms 
that while each sphere has its own autonomous powers and responsibilities and must 
exercise them within the parameters of its own defined space, all three spheres must 
work together in order to ensure that the government as a whole fulfils its constitutional 
responsibilities.'
35
 The third element is a constraining element which has the effect of 
limiting the manner in which each sphere may exercise their respective powers. Each 
sphere is bound to exercise its powers in terms of the principles of co-operative 
governance espoused in the Constitution. Section 41(1) provides that 
 
All spheres of government and all organs of state within each sphere must  
[…] 
(d) be loyal to the Constitution, the Republic and its people; 
(e) respect the constitutional status, institutions, powers and functions of 
government in the other spheres; 
                                               
32 S Woolman & T Roux 'Chapter 14: Co-operative Government & Intergovernmental Relations' in S 
Woolman et al (eds) CLOSA at 14-7. 
33 2001 (3) SA 925 (CC). 
34 Ibid. at para 26. 
35 DW Freedman op. cit. n9 at para 58. 
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(f) not assume any power or function except those conferred on them in 
terms of the Constitution; 
(g) exercise their powers and perform their functions in a manner that does 
not encroach on the geographical, functional or institutional integrity 
of government in another sphere; and 
(h) co-operate with one another in mutual trust and good faith by- 
(i) fostering friendly relations; 
(ii) assisting and supporting one another; 
(iii) informing one another of, and consulting one another on, 
matters of common interest; 
(iv) co-ordinating their actions and legislation with one another; 
(v) adhering to agreed procedures; and 
(vi) avoiding legal proceedings against one another. 
 
Therefore, the system of government created in terms of the Constitution is such that 
although each sphere of government has distinct responsibilities, each sphere must 




2.4. Allocation of legislative and executive competence  
Each sphere of government is allocated legislative and executive powers in terms of the 
Constitution. As the focus of this work is on local government, particular attention will 
be paid to the allocation of competences to this sphere. In respect of local government, 
and as a general rule, the exercise of the legislative and executive powers allocated to it 
may not be interfered with by either the provincial or national spheres of government.
37
 
The specific areas in terms of which local government is vested with legislative and 
executive powers will be discussed in detail below, however before embarking on this 
discussion it is important to understand what is meant by the terms 'executive power' 
and 'legislative power', as intended by the Constitution. 
 
Executive powers include those powers that are performed by the executive of the state, 
which in terms of local government is the municipal council.
38
 Executive powers must 
                                               
36 S Woolman & T Roux op. cit n32 at 14-9. 
37 The Constitution; s 41(1)(f) and (g) 
38 The Constitution; s 151(2) 
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be exercised in a lawful manner.
39
 The exercise of executive powers is an 
administrative action and therefore may be subject to review in terms of the Promotion 
of Administrative Justice Act ('PAJA').
40
 Therefore, municipal councils (as with other 
executive bodies of the government) may not exercise executive powers without due 
regard to the law. Legislative power is the power to make and enact law.
41
 In terms of 
local government, legislative power vests in the municipal council.
42
 Local government 
legislation is referred to as a 'by-law'. A by-law is original legislation that is enforceable 
in the area of jurisdiction of the municipality that enacted it.  
 
Interestingly, the principle of separation of powers (in terms of which executive and 
legislative powers are kept separate and are accountable to each other in the interest of 
ensuring that the general populace is protected from the untrammelled powers of 
political organisations) is not applicable to local government, as the municipal council 
is vested with both executive and legislative powers.
43
 It has been suggested that the 
absence of separation of powers in respect of local government 'should be viewed in 
light of a municipality's specific developmental mandate'
44
 which requires participatory 
democracy and that the Constitution's intention is 'not to limit the imperative of open 
debate in a transparent setting only to legislative decisions [… but rather to] extend this 




                                               
39 See generally Y Burns 'Administrative law' in WA Joubert (ed) LAWSA 2nd ed (2003) Vol 1. 
40 Act 3 of 2000. 
41 S Seedorf  & S Sibanda 'Chapter 12: Separation of Powers' in Woolman et al (eds) CLOSA 2ed (RS4 
2012) Vol 1 at 12-22. 
42 The Constitution; s 151(2) 
43 Steytler N and de Visser J op cit. n28 at 22-35. 
44 Ibid. at 22-36 
45 Ibid. at 22-36 – 22-37. 
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3. THE ALLOCATION OF POWERS 
3.1. The importance of the Constitution 
Section 2 of the Constitution, provides that '[the] Constitution is the supreme law of the 
Republic; law or conduct inconsistent with it is invalid, and the obligations imposed by 
it must be fulfilled.'
46
 The Supreme Court of Appeal has stated that the effect of section 
2 is that the Constitution is 'the ultimate source of all lawful authority in the country 
[and no law or act can be lawfully made or performed (as the case may be)] which is 
not sanctioned by [it].'
47
 Therefore, the importance of the Constitution in respect of 
environmental governance in South Africa cannot be overstated. Henderson notes that 
'the legal source for environmental law in South Africa is in the first instance to be 
found in the Constitution […].'
48
 Henderson's comment must be seen in light of the fact 
that the Constitution advanced the status of the environment by virtue of the fact that 
entrenched in the Bill of Rights, is an environmental right.
49  
Considering that section 
7(2) mandates the state to 'respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of 
Rights,'
50
 it is apparent that local government must comply with this mandate. 
Therefore, it is critical that the operation of the Constitution in respect of environmental 
issues is fully understood by the national, provincial, and local spheres of government. 
 
However, the Constitution has given rise to a complexity that makes it difficult to 
achieve 'full integration of environmental laws.'
51
 Henderson goes so far as to suggest 
that the Constitution has made it impossible to achieve such integration, because: 
 
the Constitution provides for concurrent national and provincial legislative 
competence; functional areas of exclusive provincial legislative competence 
and for some of these competencies local authorities have been given executive 
authority and the rights of administration. A number of areas relating to the 
environment are therefore spread across these various functional areas. There 
                                               
46 The Constitution; s 2. 
47 Speaker of the National Assembly v De Lille MP 1999 (4) All SA 241 (A) at para 14. 
48 PGW Henderson Environmental Laws of South Africa (RS 24 2013) Vol 1 at 1-3. 
49 Ibid. at 1-4. 
50 The Constitution; s 7(2). 
51 PGW Henderson op.cit n48 at 1-4. 
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must accordingly be a determination of powers relating to the environment, 




Therefore, understanding the manner in which powers are allocated in terms of the 
Constitution is crucial to ensure that all role players are able to give full effect to their 
mandates, and that integrated and effective environmental governance is achieved. 
 
3.2. Original, assigned and incidental powers 
Section 156 of the Constitution establishes the powers and functions of local 
government. Local government's powers and functions may only arise from one of the 
sources contemplated in the Constitution. The exercise of any power arising contrary to 
the Constitution would be invalid. Section 156 is set out in full below: 
 
(1) A municipality has the executive authority in respect of, and has the 
right to administer- 
(a) the local government matters listed in Part B of Schedule 4 and 
Part B of Schedule 5; and 
(b) any other matter assigned to it by national or provincial 
legislation. 
(2) A municipality may make and administer by-laws for the effective 
administration of the matters which it has the right to administer. 
(3) Subject to section 151(4), a by-law that conflicts with national or 
provincial legislation is invalid. If there is a conflict between a by-law 
and national or provincial legislation that is inoperative because of a 
conflict referred to in section 149, the by-law must be regarded as valid 
for as long as that legislation is inoperative. 
(4) The national government and provincial governments must assign to a 
municipality, by agreement and subject to any conditions, the 
administration of a matter listed in Part A of Schedule 4 or Part A of 
Schedule 5 which necessarily relates to local government, if- 
(a) that matter would most effectively be administered locally; 
and 
(b) the municipality has the capacity to administer it. 
                                               
52 Ibid. at 1-4 to 1-5 (footnotes and emphasis omitted). 
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(5) A municipality has the right to exercise any power concerning a matter 
reasonably necessary for, or incidental to, the effective performance of 
its functions. 
 
It is evident that section 156(1) and (2) of the Constitution envision local government’s 
powers arising from three distinct sources. Freedman describes these powers as being 
either original powers, assigned powers, or incidental powers.
53 
Original powers are 
provided for at section 156(1)(a) of the Constitution and are those powers that are 
derived directly from the Constitution by virtue of being listed as a functional area at 
Part B of Schedule 4 or Part B of Schedule 5. Assigned powers are those that are 
assigned to local government in terms of national or provincial legislation as provided 
for in terms of section 156(1)(b) of the Constitution. Incidental powers are those that 
are reasonably necessary for, or incidental to, the effective performance of a 
municipality’s functions as provided for in terms of section 156(2) of the Constitution. 
3.2.1. Original powers 
As stated above, original powers are those that arise as a direct result of the functional 
areas listed in Part B of Schedules 4 and 5 of the Constitution. 'A municipal council has 
the authority to pass laws in respect of the local government matters listed in Part B of 
Schedule 4 and in Part B of Schedule 5.'54 For convenience, these Schedules are set out 
in full at Appendix A. Henderson notes that 'a number of areas relating to the 
environment are […] spread across the various functional areas.'
55
 The functional areas 
that prima facie appear to incorporate environment-related issues include 'air pollution', 
'municipal planning', 'municipal health services', 'water and sanitation services limited 
to potable water supply systems and domestic waste-water and sewage disposal 
systems,'
56
 'beaches', 'control of public nuisances', 'noise pollution', and 'refuse removal, 
refuse dumps and solid waste disposal.'
57
 It is evident that the listing of these functional 
                                               
53 W Freedman 'The legislative authority of the local sphere of government to conserve and protect the 
environment' (2013) at 2. Paper delivered at the Environmental Law Association's Annual Conference of 
2013. 
54 Ibid. 
55 PGW Henderson op. cit. n48 at 1-5. 
56 These are listed at Part B of Schedule 4. 
57 These are listed at Part B of Schedule 5. 
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areas is minimalistic in the sense that the scope of the functional area is not defined.
58
 
As each sphere of government is mandated not to encroach into other spheres' 
functional competences, it is crucial for the sake of effective environmental governance 
that the functional areas are clearly defined. Thus, defining the scope of these 
functional areas becomes necessary to ensure that the appropriate sphere of government 
is exercising a power that falls within that sphere’s competence, and that no unlawful 
actions are taken by the respective spheres of government. 
 
Original powers can be described as being the most significant source of local 
government power because these original powers 'cannot be removed or amended by 
ordinary statutes or provincial acts'
59
 and can only be 'altered or withdrawn if the 
Constitution itself is amended.'
60
 Original powers are therefore 'a fundamental feature 
of local government’s institutional integrity. '
61
 The original powers conferred upon 
local government in respect of these functional areas include legislative and 
administrative powers.
62
 Original legislative authority is limited to those matters listed 
in Part B of Schedule 4 and Part B of Schedule 5.
63
  
3.2.1.1. Schedule 4, Part B 
The legislative authority of local government in respect of those functional areas listed 
at Part B of Schedule 4 is shared with the national sphere of government.
64
 In terms of 
section 44(1), the national government may 'pass legislation with regard to any matter, 
including a matter within a functional area listed in Schedule 4.' As such, a prima facie 
reading of this section implies that '[t]his amounts to a general power with no apparent 
limitation.'
65
  However, section 155(7) provides that national government has 
legislative and executive authority to see to the effective performance by municipalities 
of their functions by regulating the exercise by municipalities of their executive 
                                               
58 N Steytler & Y Fessha Defining provincial and local government powers and functions: The 
management of concurrency (2005) at 6. http://www.mlgi.org.za/publications. (Accessed on 23 July 
2013). 
59 J de Visser 'Assignment of Powers to Local Governments' (2002) Local Government Working Paper 
Series No. 1 at 2. . http://www.mlgi.org.za/publications. (Accessed on 23 July 2013). 
60 W Freedman op. cit. n49 at 2 
61 Ibid. 
62 The Constitution; s 156(1) and (2). 
63 The Constitution; s 156(1)(a) read with s 156(2). 
64 The Constitution: s 44(1)(a)(ii). 
65 J Mettler 'The legislative powers of local government' (2000) Local Government Working Paper Series 





 Mettler notes that section 155(7) gives rise to two competing 
interpretations relating to the extent of national government’s legislative powers in 
respect of Schedule 4 Part B function areas.
67
 The first interpretation is that section 
155(7) limits the national government's legislative powers in respect of Schedule 4 Part 
B functional areas to a regulating competence only.
68
 The second interpretation, which 
Mettler suggests is to be preferred, is that 'legislative power of [national government] in 
respect of Schedule 4 Part B matters is unencumbered' and that section 155(7) has no 
limiting effect thereon.
69
 Mettler argues that this interpretation is to be preferred as it 
does not 'strain the apparent and unambiguous meaning of s 44(1)(a)(ii) in respect of 




Turning now to considering the status of provincial government competence in respect 
of Schedule 4 Part B functional areas, it is noted that provincial governments have 'a 
more limited legislative competence to legislate'
71
 in respect of local government 
functional areas listed at Part B of Schedule 4. Provincial governments' legislative 
competence over Schedule 4 Part B functional areas is limited by section 155(6)(a) and 
(7) 'to the function of monitoring and support and further to regulate the manner in 
which municipalities exercise their authority.'
72
 Section 155(6)(a) provides that '[e]ach 
provincial government […] by legislative and other measures, must provide for the 
monitoring and support of local government in the province'
73
 and section 155(7) 
provides that provincial governments have the legislative and executive authority to 
'see to the effective performance by municipalities of their functions in respect of 
matters listed in Schedule 4 and 5, by regulating the exercise by municipalities of their 
executive authority referred to in section 156(1).'
74
 Thus, in a manner of speaking, these 
functional areas represent an 'area of exclusive legislative competence of local 
government vis-à-vis provincial government.'
75
 
                                               
66 The Constitution; s 155(7) (own emphasis added) 




71 Ibid. at 9. 
72 Ibid. at 10. 
73 The Constitution; s 155(6)(a). 
74 The Constitution; s 155(7). 
75 J Mettler op.cit n65 at10. 
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3.2.1.2. Schedule 5 Part B  
The legislative authority of local government in respect of those functional areas listed 
at Part B of Schedule 5 is shared with the national sphere of government to the extent 
set out at section 44(2). Subsection (2) provides that 'Parliament may intervene, by 
passing legislation […] with regard to a matter falling within a functional area listed in 
Schedule 5, when it is necessary to maintain national security; to maintain economic 
unity; to maintain essential national standards; to establish minimum standards required 
for the rendering of services; or to prevent unreasonable action taken by a province 
which is prejudicial to the interests of another province or to the country as a whole.'
76
 
Clearly, it would be difficult for national government to show reason to legislate in 
terms of section 44(2).
77
 Therefore, this legislative competence should be seen as being 
an extraordinary competence conferred upon national government. Provincial 
governments' legislative competence in respect of Schedule 5 Part B functional areas is 
essentially the same as that in respect of Schedule 4 Part B functional areas (as 
discussed above).  
 
Therefore, 'while the national and provincial spheres of government are entitled to pass 
laws regulating the local government matters set out in Schedule 4B and Schedule 5B, 
they are not entitled to legislate on the ‘core’ of Schedule 4B and Schedule 5B matters. 
Instead, they are only entitled to pass framework legislation dealing with national 
standards, minimum requirements, monitoring procedures and so on.'
78
 
3.2.2. Assigned powers 
The Constitution empowers local government to exercise legislative and executive 
authority in respect of any matter assigned to it by the national or provincial spheres of 
government.
79  
It must be noted that the national and provincial spheres of government 
are not able to freely assign any power to the local government. National government’s 
powers to assign legislative powers are limited in terms of section 44(1)(a)(iii) of the 
Constitution which provides that the national government may assign any of its 
legislative powers, except the power to amend the Constitution, to any legislative body 
                                               
76 The Constitution; s 44(2). 
77 J Mettler op.cit n65 at 11-12. 
78 W Freedman op cit. n49 at 3. 
79 The Constitution; s 156(1)(b) read with s 156(2). 
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in another sphere of government. Provincial government may, in terms of section 
104(1)(c) of the Constitution, assign any of its legislative powers to a Municipal 
Council in that province. In addition, section 156(4) provides that 
 
[t]he national government and provincial governments must assign to a 
municipality, by agreement and subject to any conditions, the administration of 
a matter listed in Part A of Schedule 4 or Part A of Schedule 5 which 
necessarily relates to local government, if - 
(a)     that matter would most effectively be administered locally; and 
(b)     the municipality has the capacity to administer it. 
 
Commenting on this subsection, Kirby et al note that '[t]he bias towards subsidiarity is 
implied in section 156(4), which compels national and provincial governments to 
assign their functional areas to municipalities if the matter is better administered locally  
and the municipality is capable of dealing with the matter.'
80
 Of particular importance is 
the manner in which the actual assignment of powers must be effected. To highlight 
this, the wordings of the provisions which provide for the exercise of assigned powers 
by the provincial and local government are relevant. Whilst provincial government may 
only exercise legislative authority over those matters which are expressly assigned to 
the province by national legislation,
81
 local government has executive authority in 
respect of, and has the right to administer any matter assigned to it by national or 
provincial legislation.
82
 Therefore, 'while the power to pass legislation on a matter that 
falls outside Schedules 4 and 5 cannot be assigned by implication to the provincial 
legislatures it can be assigned by implication to the municipal councils.'
83
 
3.2.3. Incidental powers 
Finally, the Constitution provides that a municipality has the right to exercise 'any 
power concerning a matter reasonably necessary for, or incidental to, the effective 
performance of its functions.'
84
 As noted by Freedman, 'incidental powers refer to those 
powers that strictly speaking fall outside the matters over which a municipality has 
                                               
80 C Kirby, N Steytler & J Jordan 'Towards a more cooperative local government' (2007) 22 SAPR/PL at 
145. 
81 The Constitution; s 104(1)(b)(iii). 
82 The Constitution; s 156(1)(b). 
83 W Freedman op. cit. n49 at 8. 
84 The Constitution; s 156(5) 
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legislative and executive authority, but are so closely connected to the effective 
performance of its functions that they are considered to be a part of the matters over 
which a municipality has authority'.
85
 It has been suggested that the incidental powers 
should not be 'interpreted in a narrow or literal sense […] but instead local 
government's developmental mandate should be broadly construed.'
86
 Therefore, as 
argued by Steytler et al, two principles should guide the interpretations of section 
156(5): first, a purposive interpretation linked to the developmental mandate of local 
government and second, incidental powers should not be used to 'increase the 
functional ambit of local government's powers but rather to enhance the efficacy of 
administering an existing function area.'
87
 
3.3. Municipalities' mandate in terms of section 24 of the Constitution 
Local government’s role in terms of the management and protection of the environment 
is important. Where determining whether or not local government powers have been 
infringed, it has been suggested that it is important to examine the 'purpose and effect' 
of the allegedly infringing exercise of power (be it an executive action or legislative 
action). If, considering the purpose and effect, such power overlaps with the mandate of 
developmental local government, it should be deemed to be constitutionally 
impermissible and therefore invalid.
88
 This is implied in that local government is vested 
with the executive and legislative power in respect of several functional areas that have 
an impact on environmental concerns.
89
 In addition to the implied environmental 
mandate, an express mandate is provided in that local government has been tasked to 
meet a 'developmental mandate'. In terms of the White Paper on Local Government, 
1998
90 
the notion of 'developmental local government' is comprised of four 
characteristics: 
1. Maximising economic growth and social development: local 
government is instructed to exercise its powers and functions in a way 
that has a maximum impact on economic growth and social 
development of communities. 
                                               
85 W Freedman op. cit. n49 at 8. 
86 N Steytler & J de Visser op. cit. n28 at 22-48. 
87 Ibid. 
88 J De Visser 'Demarcating provincial and local powers regarding liquor retail' (2004) 19 SAPR/PL at 
368. 
89 As listed above. 
90 White Paper on Local Government (9 March 1998) 
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2. Integrating and coordinating: local government integrates and 
coordinates developmental activities of other state and non-state agents 
in the municipal area. 
3. Democratic development: public participation: local government 
becomes the vehicle through which citizens work to achieve their 
vision of the kind of place in which they wish to live. 
4. Leading and learning: municipalities must build social capital, 
stimulate the finding of local solutions for increased sustainability and 




It has been suggested that these four characteristics 'are not only fundamental to giving 
content to local government’s developmental mandate but that they are also very useful 
in interpreting constitutional and statutory provisions that deal with local 
government.'
92
 Whilst the developmental mandate does not directly relate to the 
environment, it can be argued that the inclusion of the environmental right at section 24 
of the Constitution creates a duty on the state to progressively realise such right. Local 
government, as an organ of state, is mandated to ensure the progressive realisation of 
this right. Du Plessis argues that '[t]he Constitution [...] reiterates the role of local 
government in the realisation or fulfilment of the environmental right.'
93 
In support of 




 and section 153(a) 
noting that 
 
[a]n inclusive reading of the Constitution, together with an understanding of 
the inseparable link between, on the one hand, environmental resources such as 
water, air and soil, and, on the other, 'basic needs' serves to reinforce the idea 
that the Constitution creates a legally valid and enforceable environmentally 
relevant expectation on the part of rights holders. It is the enforceable duty of 
local government to realise the section 24 environmental right within the limits 
of the scope of its constitutional powers. 'To realise' in the constitutional 
context refers to the taking of positive measures and the investment of 
                                               
91 Community Law Centre Developmental Local Government Determining Appropriate Functions and 
Powers (2007) 8-9. 
92 Ibid. at 9 (own emphasis added). 
93 A du Plessis ''Local environmental governance' and the role of local government in realising section 24 
of the South African Constitution (2010) Stell LR at 268. 
94 The Constitution; s 152(1)(b), which provides that the objects of local government are, inter alia, to 
ensure the provision of services to communities in a sustainable manner. 
95 The Constitution; s152(1)(b), which provides the objects of local government are, inter alia, to 
promote a safe and healthy environment. 
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In addition, the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act
97
 ('Municipal Systems Act') 
further provides evidence of an environment-related mandate. In terms of section 4(2), 
municipalities must 'strive to ensure that municipal services are provided to the local 
community in a financially and environmentally sustainable manner, '
98
 and 'promote a 
safe and healthy environment in the municipality.'
99
 In terms of section 23 
municipalities must undertake 'developmentally-oriented planning so as to ensure that it 
strives to achieve the objects of local government set out in section 152 of the 
Constitution; gives effect to its developmental duties as required by section 153 of the 
Constitution; and contributes to the progressive realisation of the fundamental rights 
contained in section 24 of the Constitution.'
100
 The Municipal Systems Act further 
provides that all municipalities must each adopt an integrated development plan 
('IDP').
101
 An IDP must include, inter alia, a spatial development framework ('SDF') 
which 'must include the provision of basic guidelines for a land use management 
system for the municipality.'
102
 Therefore, it is evident that local government is seen as 




                                               
96 A Du Plessis op. cit. n93 at 268-269. 
97 Act 32 of 2000. 
98 Act 32 of 2000; s 4(2)(d). 
99 Act 32 of 2000: s 4(2)(i). 
100 Act 32 of 2000: s 23(1). 
101 Act 32 of 2000: s 25. 
102 Act 32 of 2000: s 26(e). 
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4. NATIONAL LEGISLATION DEFINING LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
4.1. Introduction 
Considering the complexity of local government as a sphere of government in the 
constitutional scheme, Van Wyk pointed out that '[a] comprehensive legislative 
structure is necessary to address all [the] functions of municipalities.'
103 
National 
legislation has been promulgated that further defines the manner in which local 
government operates. Such legislation will be discussed below. 
4.2. Local Government: Municipal Systems Act104 
As was briefly shown above, the Municipal Systems Act is one of the principle statutes 
which regulate the functioning of local government. The long title of the Municipal 
Systems Act confirms that its purpose is, inter alia: 
 
to provide for the manner in which municipal powers and functions are 
exercised and performed […] to establish a framework for support, monitoring 
and standard setting by other spheres of government in order to progressively 
build local government into an efficient, frontline development agency capable 
of integrating the activities of all spheres of government for the overall social 
and economic upliftment of communities in harmony with their local natural 





Chapter 2 of the Municipal Systems Act confirms the constitutional principles of local 
government autonomy and co-operative governance. Specifically, section 3(2) provides 
that 
 
[t]he national and provincial spheres of government must, within the 
constitutional system of co-operative government envisaged in section 41 of 
the Constitution, exercise their executive and legislative authority in a manner 
                                               
103 J Van Wyk 'Parallel planning mechanisms as a 'recipe for disaster'' (2012) 12(1) PER/PELJ at 223. 
104 Act 32 of 2000. 
105 Act 32 of 2000; Long title. 
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that does not compromise or impede a municipality’s ability or right to 




The Municipal Systems Act therefore specifically requires that the national and 
provincial spheres of government may not compromise or impede local government 
from exercising its administrative and legislative powers. Thus, the autonomy of local 
government is affirmed through the operation of the Municipal Systems Act. 
 
The rights and duties of municipalities are provided for at section 4, and include the 
right to 'exercise the municipality’s executive and legislative authority, and to do so 
without improper interference'
107
 and the duty to 'promote a safe and healthy 
environment in the municipality.'
108
 Therefore, the Municipal Systems Act reaffirms 
the autonomy of local government and further mandates local government to promote a 
safe and healthy environment within its area of jurisdiction. This mandate is an 
important element that has been used by the courts in interpreting functional areas 




A further important duty set out in the Municipal Systems Act is to 'contribute [...] to 
the progressive realisation of the fundamental rights contained in sections 24 […] of the 
Constitution.'
110
 In addition, the Municipal Systems Act requires that '[a] municipality 
must in the exercise of its executive and legislative authority respect the rights of 
citizens and those of other persons protected by the Bill of Rights.'
111
 As already noted, 
all municipalities are required to adopt an IDP, which includes a SDF which sets out 
basic guidelines for land use management within the municipality. Therefore, the 
Municipal Systems Act requires that local governments consider environmental 
concerns where exercising municipal planning powers. 
4.3. Local Government: Municipal Structures Act112 
In terms of the Constitution, three categories of municipalities can be established: 
                                               
106 Act 32 of 2000; s 3(2). 
107 Act 32 of 2000; s 4(1)(b). 
108 Act 32 of 2000; s 4(2)(i). 
109 See discussion of cases at chapter 5 below. 
110 Act 32 of 2000; s 4(2)(j). 
111 Act 32 of 2000; s4(3). 
112 Act 117 of 1998. 
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(a) Category A: A municipality that has exclusive municipal executive and 
legislative authority in its area. 
(b) Category B: A municipality that shares municipal executive and 
legislative authority in its area with a category C municipality within 
whose area it falls. 
(c) Category C: A municipality that has municipal executive and 





As is evident from the above, the division of legislative and executive authority 
between municipalities is provided for. This is because local municipalities (Category 
B) fall within the jurisdiction of district municipalities (Category C) and share 
legislative and executive authority over the functional areas assigned in terms of the 
Constitution.
114
 The Constitution does not provide which functional areas are assigned 
to local or district municipalities, but does require that national legislation 'make 
provision for an appropriate division of powers and functions between municipalities 
when an area has municipalities of both category B and category C.'
115
 The national 
legislation in terms of which such division of functional areas is provided for is the 
Local Government: Municipal Structures Act ('Municipal Structures Act'). In terms 
section 84 of the Municipal Structures Act, the functional areas listed in Schedule 4 and 
5 as local government competences are divided between district and local 
municipalities. The manner in which the Municipal Structures Act assigns functional 
areas between these two categories of municipalities is to list specifically those areas 
which are to be exercised by a district municipality, and to leave the remainder of the 
functional areas allocated in terms of Schedules 4 and 5 to local municipalities.
116
 
Should a dispute arise concerning the performance of a function or the exercise of a 
power, the Municipal Structures Act specifically provides that the MEC for local 
government in the province must resolve the dispute by defining their respective roles 
in the performance of that function or in the exercise of that power.
117
 It has been 
                                               
113 The Constitution; s 155(1).  
114 N Steytler 'District municipalities - giving effect to shared authority in local government' (2003) 7(2) 
Law, Democracy & Development at 228. 
115 The Constitution; s 155(3)(c) 
116 Act 117 of 1998; s 84(1)-(2) read with s 83(1). The matters assigned to district municipalities are set 
out at Annexure B hereto. 
117 Act 117 of 1998; s 86. 
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suggested that whilst such dispute resolution mechanism 'avoids paralysis'
118
 it is not an 
efficient solution 'since the MEC could be called upon to resolve innumerable 
squabbles over minor issues, and then must adhere to the lengthy process of 
consultation and publish the result by notice in the Provincial Gazette.'
119
 In addition, 
the MEC being called upon to resolve disputes may in fact be an instance of provincial 
interference and arguably be an unlawful intrusion into the functional area of local 
government.
120
 This apparent infringement of the constitutional system of government 
is indicative of the complexity of the system, and evidences an apparent lack of critical 
understating of the operation of the Constitution in this subject matter. 
 
Kirby et al note that three areas of uncertainty have arisen in respect of the division of 
functional areas in terms of the Municipal Structures Act, '[f]irst, how to distinguish 
when a matter is no longer a local matter but a district one; second, the broad definition 
of some functions; and third, the over inclusiveness of some district powers.121 
 
Although inter-municipal conflict is not the focus of this paper, it is worth noting that 
the division of functional areas in terms of the Municipal Structures Act bears the same 
minimalistic nature as the Constitution, and therefore suffers from the same potential 
problems. 
  
                                               
118 C Kirby, N Steytler & J Jordan op. cit. n80 at 150. 
119 Ibid. 
120 Ibid. 
121 Ibid. at 149. 
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5. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF FUNCTIONAL AREAS 
5.1. Introduction 
As has been shown above, the manner in which powers are allocated to the three 
spheres of government in terms of the Constitution provides a fertile ground for conflict 
arising from the situation where different views are held as to what a particular 
functional area entails. Due to this, the courts have played a significant role in 
delineating the boundaries of these functional areas and in providing principles in terms 
of which this should be done. Steytler et al note the importance of such judicial 
interpretation stating that 'as an integral part of the Constitution, the meaning of 




Where any statute falls to be interpreted by a court the divergent theories of 
interpretation play an important role in determining the final interpretation settled upon 
by a court. This is especially true where the text to be interpreted is the Constitution. In 
this light, it has been suggested that ideological considerations may play an important 
role in the interpretation of the listed functional areas.
123
 It is argued that proponents of 
centralisation of government would favour a different interpretation to proponents of 
decentralisation of government.
124
 Thus it has been argued that judicial interpretation, 
specifically with reference to the local government functional areas, may result in the 
powers of the local sphere of government being drastically circumscribed (or over 
ascribed). However, based on a review of the cases set out below, it is apparent that this 
has not been the case. The courts have adopted a purposive approach to interpreting the 
Constitution. The Constitutional Court has commented that 
 
[i]n the interpretation of those Schedules [to the Constitution] there is no 
presumption in favour of either the national legislature or the provincial 
legislatures. The functional areas must be purposively interpreted in a manner 
                                               
122 N Steytler & YT Fessha 'Defining local government powers and functions' (2007) 124(2) SALJ at 324. 
123 Ibid. at 325 
124 I Rauthebach & R Malherbe Constitutional Law 3ed (1999) 81 as cited in N Steytler & YT Fessha op. 
cit. n122 at 325. 
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which will enable the national Parliament and the provincial legislatures to 




This statement by the court reflects that the 'determining factor in interpreting the 
functional area is enabling the respective legislatures to discharge their responsibilities 
completely and successfully.'
126
 It may even be suggested that the Constitution favours 
that local government be granted as much power as possible as provision is made for 
the mandatory assignment by the national and provincial spheres of their respective 




Judicial interpretation is therefore an important tool for unpacking the meaning, content 
and scope of the listed functional areas. Recently, the courts have been tasked with 
pronouncing on several cases that dealt with the interpretation of functional areas. 
These cases will be discussed below. 
5.2. Ex parte President of the Republic of South Africa: In re Constitutionality 
of the Liquor Bill 
128
 
Although the Liquor Bill case did not deal with any of the environment-related 
functional areas, it is nevertheless an important case in the jurisprudence of the manner 
in which the courts have approached the task of interpreting the functional areas listed 
in the Constitution. 
 
In this case, the issue before the Constitutional Court was whether the national 
government had intruded into the provincial government's exclusive competence in 
respect of the functional area of 'liquor licences' by adopting a Bill regulating, inter 
alia, liquor licensing. In reaching its decision, the court noted that 'the Constitution-
makers' allocation of powers to the national and provincial spheres appears to have 
proceeded from a functional vision of what was appropriate to each sphere....'129 The 
court adopted the approach that the functional areas listed at Schedule 4 and Schedule 5 
                                               
125 Western Cape Provincial Government and others: In re DVB Behuising (Pty) Ltd v North West 
Provincial Government and another 2001 (1) SA 500 (CC) at para 17. 
126 N Steytler & YT Fessha op. cit. n122 at 325. 
127 The Constitution; s 156(4). 
128 2000 (1) SA 732 (CC). 
129 Supra n128 at para 51 (own emphasis added). 
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of the Constitution must be interpreted in light of this 'functional vision'.
130
 As will be 
discussed below, the court's expression of the importance of this 'functional vision' is of 
great value when considering the status of local government vis-à-vis environmental 
governance. 
 
In order to give effect to the functional vision, the court found that it was necessary to 
analyse the manner in which Schedule 5 functional areas operated within the greater 
constitutional scheme. Relying on the manner in which the Constitution provided for 
conflicts between national and provincial legislation, the court reached the conclusion 
that 'the Constitution contemplates that Schedule 5 competences must be interpreted so 
as to be distinct from Schedule 4 competences.'
131
 Therefore, those functional areas 
which are assigned to provincial government should be interpreted as having 'distinct 
identities, which can be differentiated from other functional areas.'
132
 This reasoning 
then led the court to differentiate functional areas based on, inter alia, the territorial 
limits of the actual exercise of power of each sphere of government. In considering 
these territorial limits, the court stated that where issues could be dealt with at an inter-
provincial level these should be seen as falling within the national government’s 
competence and that where issues could be dealt with at an intra-provincial level these 
should be seen as falling within the provincial governments' competence.
133
 The court 
accordingly stated that 'where provinces are accorded exclusive powers these should be 
interpreted as applying primarily to matters which may appropriately be regulated intra-
provincially.'
134
 Therefore, the court essentially found that the allocation of exclusive 
powers to the province would be contrary to the functional vision if such powers 
included the ability to legislate in respect of matters that have effects beyond the 
territorial limits of the respective provinces. 
 
In this regard, the Liquor Bill case highlights that where conflict arises regarding the 
scope of functional areas, a purposive approach to interpretation must be adopted to 
ensure that the intention of the legislature is given effect. In this case, the intention of 
the Constitution was expressed as the 'functional vision of what was appropriate to each 
                                               
130 N Steytler & YT Fessha op. cit. n122 at 325. 
131 Supra n128 at para 48 
132 N Steytler & YT Fessha op. cit. n122 at 326. 
133 Supra n128 at 51. 
134 Supra n128 at 52. 
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sphere'.  Although the court pronounced on the national-provincial dynamic in this 
case, the territorial principle that was applied to inform the functional vision of the 
Constitution should apply where interpreting any overlap of functional areas.
135
 As 
such, it is submitted that where a dispute arises as to the scope of a functional area 
assigned to local government, such functional area should be interpreted in light of the 
statement that 'only matters that have no extra-municipal dimensions fall within local 
government's domain.'
136
 Therefore, only intra-municipal matters should fall within the 
scope of powers vested in the local government through the allocation of the various 
functional areas. De Visser, in discussing this judgment, notes that the delineation of 
functional areas must be informed by three considerations. First, delineation cannot be 
absolute and overlap is inevitable. Second, despite the first consideration, delineation is 
necessary to inform discussions within the context of co-operative governance. Thirdly, 
in deciding whether the exercised power lies outside of authority of a particular sphere, 
the purpose and effect of such act must be taken into account.
137
 From an 
environmental perspective, application of the territorial principle appears, prima facie, 
to be nearly impossible to apply. This is because there is no generally accepted concept 
of what is meant by the term environment. Glazewski notes that environmental 
concerns may encompass a broad array of fields, from matters connected to the natural 
environment to matters connected with the build environment.
138
 Giving meaning to the 
functional area of 'environment' therefore requires an understanding of what is meant 
by the term 'environment', as contained in Schedule 4. 
5.3. Wary Holdings v Stalwo (Pty) Ltd139 
The Wary Holdings case is an important case that deals with the division of powers 
between the three spheres of government with regard to land-use management, 
specifically in respect of the subdivision of agricultural land. The Constitutional Court 
was unable to reach a unanimous decision in this case, resulting in two judgments. It is 
noted by Steytler that '[t]he split Constitutional Court decision reflects both different 
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visions of local government and how to resolve division of powers questions through 
statutory interpretation.'
140
 As will be discussed, the methodologies adopted by the 
court in both the majority and the minority judgments are of significance in 
determining how to delineate the competences of the three spheres of government, 
where conflict arises in respect of environment-related functional areas. 
 
The relevant facts of this case are as follows. Wary Holdings ('Wary') and Stalwo 
entered into an agreement for the sale of a portion of land. At the time the agreement 
was concluded, the land was zoned as agricultural land. The seller, Wary, had applied 
for the rezoning of the land to allow for light industrial land use. The rezoning 
application was accepted, subject to certain conditions. The conditions imposed various 
obligations on Wary, the result of which was that Wary would incur substantial costs in 
preparing the land. This meant that the sale was effectively unprofitable. Stalwo 
approached the court a quo for a declaratory order that the agreement was binding. 
Wary raised the defence that, in terms of the Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act 
('SALA')
141
 the subdivision of agricultural land could only be undertaken if prior 
Ministerial permission allowing for such subdivision was granted. As the sale-
agreement did not provide for this, and such permission had not been obtained, it was 
argued that the agreement was void ab initio. Interestingly, in this case it is clear that 
the functional allocation of powers would have been relevant to deciding the dispute. 
However, as noted by Steytler whilst '[t]he Court correctly framed the dispute as one 
dealing with the constitutional distribution of powers between the different spheres of 
government, [it did] not follow through on its own analysis.'
142
 Instead the court's 
reasoning hinged upon interpreting the evolution of the definition of 'agricultural land' 
in terms of the SALA, with little or no regard placed on the allocation of functional 
areas between the different spheres of government. In this regard, SALA provides that 
'agricultural land’ means: 
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any land, except- 
(a) land situated in the area of jurisdiction of a municipal council [...] 
Provided that land situated in the area of jurisdiction of a transitional council as 
defined in section 1 of the Local Government Transition Act, 1993 (Act No. 
209 of 1993), which immediately prior to the first election of the members of 





As the proviso in this definition clearly made reference to 'transitional councils', the 
question that arose in this case was whether the proviso only existed during the lifetime 
of transitional councils, or whether it continued to apply where transitional councils 
were replaced by elected municipal councils.
144
 The High Court found that the 
reference to 'transitional councils' was intended to pinpoint a period in time, and 
therefore the proviso continued to apply even when transitional councils ceased to 
exist. On appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal, the court overturned the High Court 
decision finding that  
 
the proviso was meant to operate only for as long as the land envisaged therein 
remained situated in the jurisdiction of a transitional council. It was a simple 
matter for the legislature to say so expressly if it intended such land to retain 
the classification after transitional councils ceased to exist.
145  
 
This meant that 'once transitional councils were replaced by municipal councils in 
2000, the classified land lost its agricultural character, unless [that land was] 
specifically declared by the minister to be agricultural land.'
146
 On further appeal to the 
Constitutional Court the majority decided that the proviso continued to operate despite 
transitional councils ceasing to exist. Unfortunately, the court did not 'attempt to show 
why municipalities have ‘the competence and capacity’ to administer land falling in 
their jurisdiction. There is no reference to any competence of local government, such as 
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 Whilst it is expected that the court would have inquired into 
the competences of the national and local sphere to administer within the functional 
area of agriculture, such inquiry did not take place. However, in the minority decision, 
Yacoob J did deal with the constitutional allocation of powers appropriately. The 
minority sought to follow the approach of the court in the Liquor Bill case. 
Accordingly, '[t]he main substance of legislation had to be determined, and the field of 
competence in which its substance falls had to be ascertained, as well as what it 
incidentally accomplishes.'
148
 Following this approach, the minority found that the 
main substance of SALA was planning, and as such concluded that 'if the planning 
function in relation to agricultural land continues to be undertaken by the Minister of 
Agriculture instead of by municipalities, it would be at odds with the Constitution in 
two respects: it would negate the municipalities’ planning function and it may trespass 
into the sphere of the exclusive provincial competence of provincial planning.'
149
 
Therefore, having concluded that SALA was in fact planning legislation meant that it 
fell within the functional area of municipal planning and not agriculture, and was thus a 
local government competence that the Minister of Agriculture could not intrude on. 
This minority decision is important in that it stresses the importance of construing 
legislation and the exercise of powers in terms of legislation within the functional 
vision of the Constitution. This places the Constitution at the forefront of determining 
all disputes relating to the division of powers between the spheres of government. As 
such, the effect and purpose of legislation must be determined in order to ensure that it 
is correctly classified within one (or more) of the functional areas listed in the 
Constitution. Once this is done, it can then be determined whether the legislation aligns 
with the constitutional division of legislative and executive competences. 
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Following from the Liquor Bill case, the trio of judgments in the Gauteng Development 
Tribunal case presented the first opportunity the courts had to deal with conflict arising 
in respect of environment-related functional areas. The Constitutional Court’s judgment 
in the Gauteng Development Tribunal case is regarded as a landmark decision which 
examined the provincial-municipal competence dynamic with specific reference to 
environmental concerns. 
 
The matter came to the Constitutional Court due to an earlier judgment by the Supreme 
Court of Appeal declaring specific chapters of national planning legislation to be 
unconstitutional. Therefore, the pertinent issue that fell to be decided by the 
Constitutional Court was whether certain chapters of the Development Facilitation 
Act151
 
('DFA') were indeed 'unconstitutional, by reason of being inconsistent with the 
constitutional scheme for the allocation of functions between the national, provincial 
and local spheres of government.'152 The facts of this case are concisely set out as 
follows: 
 
As an authorised local authority under the Town-Planning and Townships 
Ordinance (Ordinance), the City [of Johannesburg was] empowered to 
consider applications to rezone land and to establish new townships within its 
area of control. It delegated these functions to its planning committee. 
Difficulties emerged from 1997 onwards as the Tribunal, empowered by the 
[Development Facilitation] Act, began to decide applications for 'land 
developments' (in the form of rezoning applications and applications for the 
establishment of townships) within the City's jurisdiction. The City says that, 
in approving a number of these applications, the Tribunal failed to take into 
account the City's development-planning instruments, and was also more 
lenient than its own Planning Committee. According to the City, this resulted 
in decisions that undermined its development-planning, and also allowed for 




Commenting on the Supreme Court of Appeal's judgment (which judgment was 
generally accepted by the Constitutional Court) in the Gauteng Development Tribunal 
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case, Van Wyk notes that the court 'formalised planning terminology in South Africa, 
delineated the boundaries of 'municipal planning' and 'urban planning and development' 
as listed in Schedules 4 and 5 of the Constitution and, in the process, clarified the 
structure of planning law.'
154 
Van Wyk notes further that 'the [Supreme Court of 
Appeal's] clarification of planning terminology [...] formed a crucial part of the court’s 
interpretation of the provisions of Schedules 4 and 5 of the Constitution, and the 
conclusion it reached on the legislative powers of national and provincial legislatures in 
respect of planning at municipal level.'
155
 This comment shows the significance of 
formalising the terminology relating to the functional areas as this terminology is 
important in defining the boundaries of the functional areas as listed in the 
Constitution. Thus, to extrapolate to other functional areas, in order to determine the 
boundaries of the functional area ‘environment’ it would be necessary to understand 
what that word meant to the drafters of the Constitution. As previously noted, the 
Supreme Court of Appeal's reasoning was largely followed by the Constitutional Court, 
which confirmed the declaration of invalidity in respect of the DFA. 
 
The Constitutional Court, in reference to the autonomy which is granted to each of the 
threes spheres of government, stated that '[t]his autonomy cannot be achieved if the 
functional areas itemised in the schedules are construed in a manner that fails to give 
effect to the constitutional vision of distinct spheres of government.'
156
 Having accepted 
the functional vision approach established in terms of the Liquor Bill case, the 
Constitutional Court stated that '[t]he Constitution confers different planning 
responsibilities on each of the three spheres of government in accordance with what is 
appropriate to each sphere.'
157
 However, in developing this functional vision 
methodology, the Constitution Court stated that 
 
the functional areas allocated to the various spheres of government are not 
contained in hermetically sealed compartments. But that notwithstanding, they 
remain distinct from one another. This is the position, even in respect of 
functional areas that share the same wording, like roads, planning, sport and 
others. The distinctiveness lies in the level at which a particular power is 
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exercised. [...] The prefix attached to each functional area identifies the sphere 





In defining the scope of 'municipal planning', the court stated that the term had 
'assumed a particular, well-established meaning which includes the zoning of land and 
the establishment of townships [and...] is commonly used to define the control and 
regulation of the use of land.'
159
 The court then stated that as there is nothing in the 
Constitution to suggest that this common usage was not what had been intended. As a 
result, it was held that the contested powers relating to land use and development fell 




Following from this finding, the court had to consider whether or not the contested 
powers also fell within the functional areas of 'urban and rural development' (a 
provincial competence). The court, in applying the dictum in the UDM
161
 case, stated 
that 'is the duty of this court, and indeed the other courts as well, to construe the 
sections of the Constitution in a manner that strikes harmony between them and gives 
effect to each and every section.'
162
 In light of this, the court held that a purposive 
interpretation of the Constitution requires that the term 'development' be construed 
narrowly 'so as to enable each sphere to exercise its powers without interference by the 
other spheres.'
163
 In doing so, the court applied the 'functional vision' of the 
Constitution, and found that it was not necessary to determine the scope of the 





In defining the boundaries of municipal planning, Van Wyk notes that the court 
identified two components of planning that describe what comprises the functional area 
of municipal planning. These components are 'land use planning' and 'land use and 
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management and land development.'
165
 Within these components, matters relating to 
environmental concerns could be considered without intruding into the functional area 
of environment. 
 
The Gauteng Development Tribunal case is further significant in that it laid the 
foundation for what is referred to as the 'bottom-up' method for interpreting the 
functional areas. This method of interpretation argues that, 'rather than attempting to 
provide an exhaustive definition of both overlapping matters, the more specific matter 
(usually one listed in Part B of Schedule 4 and Part B of Schedule 5) should be defined 
first, leaving the residual areas to the much broader matter (usually one listed in Part A 
of Schedule 4 and Part A of Schedule 5).'
166
 Unfortunately, this methodology has 
allowed the courts to steer away from having to interpret functional areas such as 
'environment' and 'urban and rural development', and therefore serves to highlight an 
inherent deficiency of judicial interpretation as it relates to the functional areas. 
Furthermore, by broadly interpreting functional areas assigned to the ‘smaller’ sphere 
of government, the courts risks being over inclusive and potentially detracting from the 
functional areas of the ‘larger’ spheres of government. 
5.5. Maccsand (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town and others167 
Although the Maccsand case did not directly deal with the scope of 'municipal 
planning' or 'environment', one of the issues that fell to the court to decide was whether 
or not the exercise of municipal planning powers by a municipality could prevent 
mining activity from occurring when mining was a national competence. The 





 and the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act 
('MPRDA').
169 
 It is worth noting that LUPO is pre-Constitution legislation, the 
administration of which was assigned to the provincial government of the Western 
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 The relevant facts that led to this dispute were that Maccsand was issued with 
a mining permit in respect of land situated within the jurisdiction of the City of Cape 
Town Metropolitan Municipality ('City of Cape Town'). The mining permit related to 
portions of land which were zoned in terms of LUPO as 'public open space and rural 
land use'. This zoning did not allow for mining. In spite of LUPO, Maccsand 
commenced mining activities on the land. This resulted in the City of Cape Town 
launching an urgent interdict to prevent such mining from continuing until the land was 




As mining is an exclusive competence of the national sphere of government,
172
 it was 
alleged by Maccsand that local government could not be permitted to regulate mining 
in terms of local planning laws because 'as mining falls under the exclusive competence 
of national government.'
173
 The argument raised was essentially that 'allowing the 
municipality to exercise land use decisions in terms of LUPO would enable the local 
government to 'veto' decisions of the national sphere on a matter that falls within the 
exclusive competence of the latter.'
174
 Maccsand further argued that if LUPO is 
applicable to mining, it 'would amount to permitting an unjustified intrusion of the local 




In determining the issue, the court analysed the relevant provisions of LUPO in order to 
determine what it was that LUPO in fact regulates, thus following the methodology 
previously adopted by the court in the Gauteng Development Tribunal case. It was 
stated that '[t]he role played by LUPO is limited to the control and regulation of the use 
of land'
176 
and did not in any way attempt to regulate mining. In disposing of 
Maccsands’ arguments, the court noted that '[w]hile the MPRDA governs mining, 
LUPO regulates the use of land. An overlap between the two functions occurs due to 
the fact that mining is carried out on land.'
177
 The court then went on to state that such 
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overlap 'does not constitute an impermissible intrusion by one sphere into the area of 
another because spheres of government do not operate in sealed compartments.'
178
  
Thus, 'sometimes the exercise of powers by two spheres may result in an overlap. 
When this happens, neither sphere is intruding into the functional area of another. Each 
sphere would be exercising power within its own competence.'
179 
 
The court, relying on the judgment in the Gauteng Development Tribunal case, 
reaffirmed that the potential for overlap between functional areas is not necessarily 
contrary to the allocation of powers as set out in the Constitution and thus gave effect 
to the principle of the 'functional vision' first stated in the Liquor Bill case. Olivier et al 
note that '[t]he question of conflicts between the MPRDA and […] other sets of 
legislation should arise only in instances where the subject matter of the legislation 
concerned is substantially identical, in which event section 146 of the Constitution […] 
and section 156(3) of the Constitution […] would apply. ' Therefore, the court clearly 
adopted the approach that functional areas should be interpreted in terms of the 
functional vision, and in the process affirming the approach established in the Liquor 
Bill case. Thus, the purpose and effect of the allegedly intrusive act of a particular 
sphere of government is fundamental in order to decide whether or not such act is 
constitutionally impermissible. 
 
The court then stated that where such overlap exists, 'the Constitution obliges these 
spheres of government to cooperate with one another in mutual trust and good faith, 
and to co-ordinate actions taken with one another.'
180
 In effect, the Constitutional Court 
'made it clear that national and provincial governments may not use legislation to take 
away or diminish the administrative responsibilities of planning that have been 
assigned to municipalities in the Constitution.'
181
 The court took cognisance of the fact 
that the MPRDA did not contain any provision that suggested that LUPO (or other 
planning law) ceased to apply in respect of land encumbered by a mining right awarded 
in terms of the MPRDA. In fact, the court found that the opposite view was intended in 
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that the MPRDA specifically required that a mining right is subject to the provisions 
contained in the MPRDA and to other relevant laws.
182
   
 
Therefore, it is evident that the functional areas were interpreted in a purposive way to 
give effect to the ‘functional vision’ and a bottom-up approach was applied. Following 
this approach, the functional area of 'environment' should be interpreted to ensure that it 
does not include any powers falling within any of the local government competences. 
However, there is little likelihood of the court defining the functional area of 
environment as the bottom-up methodology effectively precludes the necessity for 
doing so. With this in mind, it appears that the functional area of environment should 
be construed as a broad matter, which includes what would usually have been 
understood to fall within such powers, but not including any powers that are exercised 
by local government. Practically speaking, the lack of a clear definition for the 
functional area has the potential to adversely affect environmental-governance. 




The Shelfplett case represents an interesting analysis of the scope of provincial planning 
vis-à-vis municipal planning. The facts of the case are as follows. Shelfplett owned 
various portions of land falling within the jurisdiction of the Bitou Municipality. In 
order to develop the land, various planning approvals needed to be obtained, as well as 
an amendment of the Knysna-Wilderness-Plettenberg Bay Regional Structure Plan ('the 
RSP'). An application for amendment of the RSP was submitted to the provincial MEC 
for consideration. This application was supported by the Bitou Municipality but was 
eventfully refused by the MEC. The MEC provided the following reasons for his 
decision: 
 
(a) where the local authority failed to establish the required urban edge, the 
MEC assesses a suitable urban edge to ensure that there is sufficient land for 
future development while attaining higher densities; (b) the existence of a golf 
estate and polo estate in the area did not justify a northward shift in the urban 
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edge; (c) township development in a northerly direction was undesirable given 
the exceptionally attractive landscape; (d) the proposed development would put 
added pressure on the N2; (e) persons employed at the new development would 
have to travel substantial distances to reach the property, in conflict with the 
WC SDF's aim of bringing work opportunities closer to where employees 
reside and (f) the development would entail potential expense for the Bitou 




Upon refusal of the amendment application, Shelfplett had launched an application in 
which it sought, inter alia, the 'review and setting aside of the MEC's refusal on various 
grounds, including that he had based his decision on considerations that involved an 
impermissible intrusion into the Municipality's exclusive executive competence in 
respect of municipal planning.'
185
 Such review was brought in terms of the PAJA.
186
 
Essentially, the pertinent issue in this case was that should it be found that the MEC's 
decision to refuse the amendment of the RSP had been materially influenced by 
considerations of a 'municipal planning' nature, such decision would have to be set 
aside. As such, the court was required to balance the planning powers conferred in 
terms of the functional areas of provincial planning and municipal planning.  
 
In making its determination, the court noted that 'it is legitimate in interpreting these 
[functional areas] to have regard to the existing range of planning legislation at the time 
the Constitution was enacted'.
187
 As such, the court analysed the effect of the Physical 
Planning Act 125 of 1991 (“the 1991 PPA”) and found that  
 
a [regional structure plan] appears to have been conceived as a provincial 
planning instrument since it was the administrator of a province who was 
empowered to cause the plan to be prepared and who had the power to approve 
and amend it. A regional structure plan would generally straddle several 
municipal areas […] dealing with land in fairly broad brush strokes and 
employing a relatively small number of broad categories of land use. 
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Based on this, the court held that since the 1991 PPA, and in particular, regional 
structure plans in terms of the 1991 PPA, fall within the competence of provincial 
planning, 'all the considerations which the [1991 PPA] authorises the relevant authority 
to take into account in approving or amending an RSP are permissible provincial 
planning considerations.'
188
 In reaching this conclusion, the court noted that it is 
important to draw a distinction between the 'function entrusted to an authority and the 
considerations he may take into account in performing the function.'
189
 In doing so, the 
court differentiated the present case from that of the Gauteng Development Tribunal 
case, in terms of which the court was required to investigate the function and not the 
'considerations that may be taken into account in performing the function.'
190
 The court 
then stated that such considerations 'take their character from the function to which they 
relate.'
191
 The court therefore dismissed the ground of review relating to the intrusion 
into the local government functional area, despite accepting that such an interpretation 
meant that the same or similar considerations may be taken into account by both 
provincial government and local government. 
 
Thus, in analysing the manner in which the legislation giving rise to the exercise of a 
function operated, the court was able to determine that due to the fact that the exercise 
of the function related to provincial concerns and did not take away from the 
municipality’s powers to administer municipal planning, and therefore such function 
was a power in terms of provincial planning. The Shelfplett case explains an interesting 
nuance in interpreting the functional areas, being that the functional areas relate to the 
power to be exercised and not to the considerations that can be taken into account in 
exercising these powers. Thus, in terms of environmental governance, it would be 
appropriate for all spheres of government to take into account environment-related 
considerations when exercising other powers. This would appear to complement the 
manner in which NEMA provides that the national environmental management 
principles contained therein apply 'throughout the Republic to the actions of all organs 
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of state that may significantly affect the environment.'
192
 Unfortunately, the case is only 
a High Court judgment and has only persuasive value in other jurisdictions. 
5.7. Clairison’s CC v MEC for Local Government, Environmental Affairs and 
Development Planning and another193 
In the Clairison’s case, 'municipal planning' again formed the context of an inquiry into 
the constitutional allocation of powers between spheres of government. The applicant 
raised a ground of review in terms of the PAJA that the Minister had unlawfully made a 
decision to refuse an application for environmental authorisation under the now 
repealed Environmental Conservation Act ('ECA')194 insofar as he had unlawfully 
intruded into the local sphere of government by taking into account municipal planning 
concerns.195 Therefore, the application related to conflict between the functional areas 
of environment and municipal planning. The ground of review being that the Minister 
was materially influenced by an error of law. The court dismissed this ground of 
review.196 The facts of this case therefore bears a strong similarity to those of the 
Shelfplett case, in that it was alleged that considerations taken into account intruded in 
the functional area, and not the actual exercise of the power itself. The court formulated 
that the issue as being 'whether the Minister could permissibly take into account 
municipal planning considerations (or, put differently, the spatial context of the 




In reaching its decision, the court relied on the judgment in the Shelfplett case
198
 and 
stated that the Minister must be able to give consideration to the spatial context of the 
applicant’s land in relation to environmental factors, and that if this was not allowed, 
the Minister would be unduly prevented from exercising powers lawfully granted to 
him in terms of the ECA.
199
 Therefore, it is evident that the court agreed with the 
Shelfplett reasoning in terms of which the distinction between the function entrusted to 
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a sphere of government and the considerations that may be taken into account in 
performing that function. The court then stated that 'having regard to considerations 
which the Municipality could or should take into account when deciding on municipal 
planning issues, does not preclude another sphere of government from taking into 
account the very same considerations in the exercise of its functions.'
200
 Therefore, the 
allocation of functional areas in terms of the Constitution does not necessarily preclude 
overlap between the functional areas and in addition, more than one sphere of 





It is submitted that the reasoning of the court in both the Shelfplett and Clairison's cases 
is correct. In addition, these judgments show the significance of determining the actual 
function being performed; it is this, and not the considerations taken into account, that 
is allocated in terms of the Constitution. Therefore, as stated previously, from an 
environmental perspective, it would be appropriate for environmental considerations to 
be taken into account in respect of the performance of all other functional areas. 
5.8. Mtunzini Conservancy v Tronox KZN Sands (Pty) Ltd and another202 
The Mtunzini case is significant in that it was the first 'post-Maccsand decision in 
which the Constitutional Court's wisdom regarding the overlapping powers of the 
national and local spheres invited application.'
203 
The pertinent issue that fell to be 
determined by the court was whether or not Tronox was obliged to obtain land use 
planning permission before undertaking mining activities. As such, national and local 
competences were squarely pitted against each other. Prima facie, it would appear that 
the issues are the same as the Maccsand case, however the court distinguished these 
two cases on the basis that the present case dealt with an old-order mining right
204
 and 
that, at the commencement of mining activities, the land fell outside any town-planning 
scheme. The facts of the case were that Tronox was the holder of a converted old order 
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mining right in respect of various portions of land falling within the Mtunzini 
Municipality. In terms of the Town Planning Ordinance ('TPO')
205
 authorisation for 
certain development of land was required prior to undertaking such development. 
Mining as a land use was not expressly included in the definition of development 
requiring authorisation until an amendment to the TPO in 2008. In reaching its decision 
in this case, the court found that the now repealed Minerals Act
206
 was not subject to 
any other law (which distinguished it from the MPRDA) and fell within the exclusive 
competence of the national government, which in the pre-constitutional system was 
supreme. As a result of this, it was held that the TPO was not in conflict with the 
Minerals Act because it did not regulate mining in any respect.
207
 The court specifically 
held that the Mineral Act and the TPO should not be considered in light of the 
constitutional allocation of functional areas, as the Constitution specifically provides 
that pre-constitutional laws continue to be effective without any extension of territorial 
or other limits, unless amended to provide for such.  
 
Humby is highly critical of the court’s dealing with this matter, arguing that the 
reliance placed by the court on the exclusivity of the Minerals Act, and the failure to 
'situate the sphere of local government – and by extension the function of municipal 
planning – within its proper constitutional context'
208
 lead to a fundamentally incorrect 
decision that conflicts with the principles espoused in the Maccsand case. Humby 
suggests that if the court had correctly applied the principles of the Maccsand case it 
could have reasoned that a local government was entitled to regulate land-use planning 
in its jurisdiction, regardless of perceived conflict that might arise due to the purported 
'exclusivity' of the Minerals Act as a pre-Constitutional law.
209
 Humby’s criticism 
appears to be valid. Whilst the Mtunzini case therefore does not contribute further to 
the definitions of functional areas, it highlights that judicial interpretation is, by itself, 
not a sufficient mechanism for achieving suitable definitions of the functional areas.  
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5.9. Le Sueur v eThekwini Municipality and others210 
The Le Sueur case represented a further opportunity for the court to consider the 
functional area of municipal planning vis-à-vis that of environment. The judgment of 
Gayanda J raises interesting issues that arise from a narrow application of the 
methodologies adopted in the Gauteng Development Tribunal case. The facts of this 
case are briefly set out. The TPO,
211
  which regulated planning in the old province of 
Natal, was repealed and replaced by the KwaZulu-Natal Planning and Development 
Act ('PDA').
212
  In terms of the TPO, a local authority was empowered to prepare a 
town-planning scheme. Such scheme set out the spatial planning objectives of the local 
council, and all development within such scheme fell for prior approval. During 2012, 
the municipal council of the first respondent, the eThekwini Metropolitan Municipality, 
adopted a resolution amending its town-planning scheme. The amendment introduced 
the Durban Open Space System ('D-MOSS') as an element of the town-planning 
scheme. Essentially, D-MOSS is intended to create a system of open spaces where no 
development is permitted, or is strictly regulated. The purpose of creating these open 
spaces is to link areas that have been identified by the municipal council as being areas 
within the Municipality having high biodiversity value.
213
 In order to ensure that D-
MOSS is effective, no land falling within the D-MOSS areas may be developed 
'without first obtaining an environmental authorisation and even then it may only be 
developed subject to strict controls aimed at protecting the ecological goods and 
services the land provides.'
214
 In other words, a fundamental aspect of D-MOSS is the 
conservation and protection of biodiversity within the demarcated boundaries of the 
eThekwini Metropolitan Municipality; the main tool to achieve this being the use of 
environmental authorisations. 
 
The applicant in this case was the owner of land located within the jurisdiction of the 
eThekwini Metropolitan Municipality and had applied for an order declaring that the 
resolution introducing D-MOSS to the town-planning scheme was unconstitutional and 
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 The grounds advanced by the applicant justifying such an order were that, 
inter alia, as the subject matter of the resolution was the ‘environment’, which is listed 
in Schedule 4A of the Constitution and is therefore a functional area of concurrent 
national and provincial legislative competence, the resolution fell outside the legislative 
authority of the municipal council.
216
 Essentially, the argument was that the eThekwini 
Metropolitan Municipality did not have any original or assigned power to legislate 
within the functional area of the environment, and therefore the D-MOSS resolution 
was ultra vires. 
 
The court rejected this argument and dismissed the application. In reaching its decision, 
the court relied heavily on the principles developed in the Gauteng Development 
Tribunal case.  However, it is argued that the application of the Gauteng Development 
Tribunal principle by the court in the Le Sueur case was inappropriately narrow, failing 
to take into account critical factors relating to the nature of the D-MOSS.
217
 The 
reasoning adopted by the court is set out below. 
 
The court highlighted that legislation imposes a duty on each sphere of government to 
protect the environment. Particular reliance was placed on section 7(2) of the 
Constitution, which provides that 'the state must protect, promote and fulfil the rights in 
the Bill of Rights.'
218
 The court indicated that the meaning of 'state' in section 7(2) 
includes local government. The court then held that in reading section 7(2) with section 
24 of the Constitution it was clear that the obligations contained in those sections apply 
to local government and therefore it may not legislate in conflict with section 24.
219
 
Further reliance for imposition of this duty was found in section 152(1)(d) of the 
Constitution, which  requires that local government 'promote a safe and healthy 
environment.'
220
 It was against this background that the scope of the functional areas 
should be interpreted. It is relevant to note that the distinction between the function and 
the considerations in terms of which such power is exercised appear to have been 
blurred, and therefore the reasoning of the court in the Shelfplett and Clairison's cases 
is not followed. 
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In considering whether 'environment' fell within the functional area of municipal 
planning the court considered sections 156(1)(b), (4) and (5) of the Constitution, and 
stated that  
 
[i]t is apparent that although matters relating to the environment may be said, 
in terms of the Constitution, to be the primary concern of the National and 
Provincial spheres of government, Local Government in the form of 
Municipalities are in the best position to know, understand, and deal with 




The court held that all spheres of government were obliged, in terms of section 40(2) of 
the Constitution, to observe and adhere to the principles of cooperative government as 
set out in Chapter 3 of the Constitution.
222
 In addition, the court reviewed how 
municipalities have historically exercised legislative responsibility over environmental 
affairs within municipal areas. Such considerations included, inter alia, an overview of 
the powers given to Transitional Metropolitan Councils (in terms of the Local 
Government Transition Act
223
), which included powers relating to 'metropolitan 
environment conservation,'
224
 'the co-ordination of environmental affairs,
225
 and 'the 
management and control of environmental affairs;'
226 
 the  requirement that the councils 
formulate and implement an 'integrated development plan', which was defined as a plan 
aimed at integrated development in management of the Municipal Area and required 
the promotion of efficient and integrated land development with respect to a number of 
features, one of which is the encouragement of 'environmentally sustainable land 




The court then considered the position following the enactment of the Constitution. It 
stated that it is clear that 'when the functional areas were allocated in Schedules 4 and 
5, the framers of the Constitution knew what 'municipal planning' encompassed.'
228
 The 
                                               
221 Supra n210 at 46. 
222 Supra n210 at 46. 
223 Act 209 of 1993. 
224 Item 19 of Schedule 2. Supra n203 at 22. 
225 Item 21 of Schedule 2 (in respect of Metropolitan Councils). Supra n203 at 22. 
226 Item 14 of Schedule 2A (in respect of Metropolitan Local Councils). Supra n203 at 22. 
227 Supra n210 at 22. 
228 Supra n210 at 23. 
48 
 
court considered Chapter 5 of the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act, which 
deals with integrated development planning at municipal level and recognises in section 
23(1)(c) that there is an obligation on a municipality, together with other organs of 
State, to contribute to the progressive realisation of the fundamental rights contained in 
section 24 of the Constitution
229
 and stated that there was 'clearly a legislative mandate 
from the national legislature in regard to environmental matters.'
230
 In addition, the 
court considered that section 2(4)(f) of the Local Government: Municipal Planning and 
Performance Management Regulations (published on 24 August 2001) required spatial 
development frameworks reflected in an integrated development plan to 'contain a 
strategic assessment of the environmental impact of the spatial development 
framework.'
231
 The court stated that the Municipality is under a statutory duty to plan in 
accordance with its integrated development plan. The court therefore found that it is 
impossible as a matter of accepted town planning practice to divorce environmental and 




It is apparent that the court allowed the distinction between environmental 
considerations to be taken into account and the exercise of environment-related powers 
to become blurred. Thus the court held that municipalities are in fact authorised to 
legislate in respect of environmental matters to protect the environment at the local 
level and that the D-MOSS system falls within such competence. Freedman is critical 
of the court’s finding that the functional area of municipal planning encompasses 
environmental matters.
233
 He has noted that 'it is not clear whether the functional area 
of municipal planning can be interpreted to encompass environmental matters'. In 
support of this argument, Freedman highlighted four issues that arise in the court’s 
judgment. Firstly, Freedman noted that 'the court does not clearly define which aspects 
of the functional area of ‘environment’ are encompassed by the functional area of 
‘municipal planning’'.
234
 This appears to be because the court did not examine the D-
MOSS system in any great detail. Freedman has suggested that '[a] cursory examination 
of the D-MOSS system […] indicates that it is primarily concerned with 
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‘environmental authorisations’ and the ‘protection of biodiversity’. '
235
 Secondly, that 
'including environmental authorisations and the protection of biodiversity in the 
functional area of municipal planning potentially upsets the division of subject-matters 
envisaged by the drafters of the Constitution.'
236
 This is because, 'Schedules 4 and 5 
indicates that the drafters [of the Constitution] allocated certain environmental matters 
to the local sphere of government, for example air pollution, noise pollution and refuse 
removal, refuse dumps and solid waste disposal, and reserved the rest for the national 
and provincial spheres.'
237
 Therefore, allowing local government to exercise additional 
environmental powers is against the express provisions of the Constitution. Thirdly, 
'that including environmental authorisations and the protection of biodiversity in the 
functional area of municipal planning also means that there is […] an overlap between 
the functional area of municipal planning in Part B of Schedule 4 and the functional 
area of ‘environment’ in Part A of Schedule B. '
238
 Freedman has suggested that such an 
interpretation is contrary to the Constitutional Court’s finding in Gauteng Development 
Tribunal case, where it was stated that 'the functional areas are distinct from one 
another and one functional area should not include another.'
239
 Thus it appears that the 
court failed to understand the nuance of the principles previously adopted by the 
Constitutional Court. Finally, Freedman has argued that 'including environmental 
authorisations and the protection of biodiversity in the functional area of municipal 
planning could have unintended practical consequences.'
240
 This is because, as 
Freedman has noted, 'in the Gauteng Development Tribunal case, the Constitutional 
Court […] held that while the national and provincial governments have the power to 
pass legislation with respect to the matters listed in Part B of Schedules 4 and 5, they 
do not have the power to implement that legislation.'
241
 Such power vests exclusively in 
local government. In line with the criticism advanced by Freedman, it is evident that 
adopting a broad interpretation of municipal planning in each and every case is not 
necessarily correct. Any apparent overlap needs to be considered in great detail to 
ensure that the intention of the Constitution is not thwarted. 
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Thus, it is evident that the purpose and effect of the D-MOSS was misconstrued as 
planning legislation when in fact it appears to bear greater resemblance to 
environmental legislation. 
5.10. Minister of Local Government, Environmental Affairs and Development 




The Lagoonbay matter is a further trilogy of judgments from the High Court, Supreme 
Court of Appeal and Constitutional Court which deal with allocation of powers in terms 
of the Constitution, and in particular with the functional area of 'municipal planning'. 
The relevant facts of this case are as follows. Lagoonbay intended to develop a large 
luxury development in the Southern Cape. In order to undertake the proposed 
development, Lagoonbay was obliged to obtain various approvals, which included the 
amendment of the applicable regional structure plan
243
 and authorisations for certain 




The regional structure plan ('Structure Plan') in issue was adopted in terms of sections 5 
and 6(1) of the Physical Planning Act (i.e. the 1991 PPA).
245
  In terms of the Structure 
Plan the land on which the proposed development was intended to take place had been 
designated as land to be developed for agriculture or forestry uses.
246
 Therefore, 
Lagoonbay was required to apply for the amendment of the Structure Plan in order to 
allow for township development on such land. In addition, Lagoonbay was required to 
submit rezoning and subdivision of land applications in order to amend the town 
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Lagoonbay's application to amend the Structure Plan was accepted by the provincial 
Minister, subject to the condition (condition 1.3) that 'the associated future zoning 
application in respect of the land concerned shall be subject to approval by the 
Provincial Government as the location and impact of the proposed development 
constitutes ‘Regional and Provincial Planning.’'
248
 Lagoonbay duly submitted its 
application for rezoning and subdivision of the relevant properties,
249
 which was 
initially approved by the municipal council, however, because of the aforementioned 
condition imposed by the Provincial Minister, the municipality referred the application 
to the Provincial Minister for the 'necessary further attention.'
250
 The Minister refused 
the application.
251
 Lagoonbay then approached the High Court for an order setting aside 
the decision of the Minister to refuse the application for rezoning and subdivision in 
terms of LUPO. 
 
The argument advanced by Lagoonbay in seeking such relief was that 'in the light of 
the constitutional division of power between provinces and municipalities, the 
Provincial Minister did not have the functional competence to decide rezoning and 
subdivision applications'
252
 as these fell within the functional area of municipal 
planning, which is allocated to local government.
253
 The High Court rejected this 
argument. In doing so, it stated that 'applications for rezoning and township approval 
involve aspects of 'municipal planning', which fall within the functional competence of 
municipalities.'
254
 However, in certain circumstance, such as the present case, 'land-use 
planning decisions exceed the bounds of municipal planning, and therefore require 
provincial oversight, because of the scope of the interests they affect.'
255
 Thus the High 
Court found that the Provincial Minister was entitled to decide rezoning and 
subdivision of land applications where these constituted regional planning, or 
provincial planning.  
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The Supreme Court of Appeal overturned this decision and held that 'under the 
Constitution rezoning and subdivision applications fall to be dealt with by 
municipalities and therefore that the Provincial Minister lacked the power to refuse 
Lagoonbay’s applications [and] accordingly declared the Provincial Minister’s rezoning 




In the Constitutional Court, the Provincial Minister advanced three arguments: 
 
First, Lagoonbay has not challenged condition 1.3 and sought to have it set 
aside. The imposition of condition 1.3 was an administrative act that continues 
to have legal consequences, including the consequence of empowering the 
Province to decide rezoning and subdivision applications. Accordingly, the 
Provincial Minister was lawfully empowered to refuse Lagoonbay’s 
applications in April 2011. Second, sections 16 and 25 of LUPO empower 
provincial functionaries to make rezoning and subdivision decisions. Because 
there has been no attack on the validity of LUPO, Lagoonbay is not entitled to 
attack the Provincial Minister’s exercise of his powers under that Ordinance. 
Third, even if the first two arguments do not succeed, the rezoning and 
subdivision applications sought by Lagoonbay fall within the Province’s 




In response to the Provincial Minster's arguments, Lagoonbay argued that the Minister 
could not have performed any act that would allow the usurpation of functions that the 
Constitution reserves for municipalities, that the Constitution has impliedly amended or 
repealed sections 16 and 25 of LUPO, and that in light of the Gauteng Development 





In dealing with the implied repeal or amendment of offending provisions of LUPO, the 
court dismissed Lagoonbay's argument and stated that '[a]s a matter of general 
principle, old-order legislation remains in force until the necessary steps are taken to 
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have it set aside'
259
 and that no such steps have been taken in respect of LUPO, whether 
by legislative action or juridical relief.
260
 Therefore, the court held that no provisions of 
LUPO have been impliedly amended or repealed. The court relied on the following 
criteria to determine this: first, was there unequivocal and inescapable incompatibility 
between the allegedly offending provisions of legislation and the Constitution;
261
 
second, could the offending provisions be isolated and readily and easily removed to 
address the alleged unconstitutionally; and third, does the Constitution (or other 
legislation) offer an equivalent framework for the exercise of the allegedly 
unconstitutional powers.
262
 In this case, the court found that none of the criteria were 
satisfied to suggest the LUPO provisions were amended or repealed.  
 
Following this finding, the court proceeded to answer the question of if it may 
'nevertheless resolve this dispute with direct reference to the prescripts of the 
Constitution regarding municipal and provincial functional competences.'
263
 In order to 
answer this, the court considered the pleadings of Lagoonbay and initially noted that 
'[a]bsent an appropriate justification for a more expansive approach, [it is] limited to 
considering the grounds of review contained in the original application [...].'
264
 
Interestingly, the pleadings revealed that Lagoonbay did not seek to impugn the validity 
of the provisions of LUPO
265
 and had never directly challenged the constitutional 
validity of the provisions. Due to this the court was reluctant to decide upon the 
constitutional status of LUPO as it would be acting effectively as a court of first 
instance. Applying the principle in the Phillips
266
 case, the court noted that in the 
absence of exceptional circumstance, the Constitutional Court should not pronounce on 
issues not 'properly pleaded and ventilated in lower court'.
267
 Therefore, despite noting 
obiter dictum that in light of the Gauteng Development Tribunal case there is at the 
very least 'a strong case for concluding that, under the Constitution, the Provincial 
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Minister was not competent to refuse the rezoning and subdivision applications,'
268
 the 
court refused to pronounce on the Constitutionality of LUPO. 
 
From this case, it is evident that whilst the court has an important role to play in 
defining the scope of functional areas, it has limited jurisdiction to ensure that the 
functional areas are given effect to in practice. It is in this light that alternative means 
of addressing such conflicts should be adopted, whether through intergovernmental co-
operation or through the use of administrative guidelines or negotiated definitions. 
5.11. Habitat Council and Another v Provincial Minister of Local Government, 
Environmental Affairs and Development Planning in the Western Cape and 
Others; City of Cape Town v Provincial Minister of Local Government, 




Recently, the Western Cape High Court delivered judgment in the Habitat Council 
case. The judgment related to two cases that were jointly heard by the court and are 
referred to in the judgment as the Habitat application and the Gordonia application. The 
pertinent issue that fell to the court to determine was the constitutionality of section 44 
of LUPO.
270
 In both the Habitat application and the Gordonia application, all the parties 
had conceded that section 44 of LUPO was unconstitutional and had requested that the 
court make such declaration of invalidity.
271
 The court noted that despite such 
concessions, it was necessary to apply its mind to the issue. It should be noted due to 
the absence of any dispute in respect of this issue, it is unlikely that any reasoned 
argument to the contrary would have been placed before the court. Thus, the court 
would have been hard pressed to come to a different conclusion than that which was 
proposed by the parties to the applications. This only highlights the inadequacy of 
judicial interpretation in respect of providing clarity to the nature of the functional 
areas. 
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Section 44 of LUPO provides for the right of appeal against decisions of the City of 
Cape Town Metropolitan Municipality ('City of Cape Town') under LUPO (i.e. land-
use planning decisions) to a provincial appeal body. The provincial appeal body was 
empowered to consider such appeals and at its sole discretion, dismiss an appeal, 
uphold an appeal wholly or in part, or make a decision in relation thereto which the 
municipal council concerned could have made. Furthermore, section 44 provides that a 
decision of the appeal body must be considered as a decision of the City of Cape Town. 
Therefore, the applicants had contended that section 44 infringed upon the 
constitutional division of powers in that it allowed the provincial government to 
infringe upon the local governments municipal planning competence. As previously 
stated, this contention was conceded to by all the respondents. 
 
In deciding the issue, the court noted that judicial precedent had established "two 
cardinal principals"
272
 that must be applied where examining the provincial-local 
government power dynamic. First, that different functional competences should be 
interpreted distinctly from one another, and second, that the functional areas assigned 
exclusively to the local sphere should be interpreted as applying primarily to matters 
that may be regulated intra-municipally.
273
 Thus, the court identified the functional 
vision approach as being important. However, although the court identified the correct 
manner in which to decide the issue, it is submitted that it incorrectly determined the 
nature of the supervisory powers provided to provincial government vis-à-vis local 
government. This aspect of the judgement will be discussed below. 
 
In order to determine this issue the court focused on the nature of the supervisory 
powers granted to provincial government vis-à-vis local government. This was because 
the court accepted that provincial government was legitimately entitiled to operate 
within the local sphere’s exclusive comeptence, but only to the extent allowed where 
exercising supervisory or regulatory powers. The court determined that it was necessary 
to distinguish the section 44 powers provided to the provincial government (in terms of 
LUPO) from the supervisory powers provided in terms of the Constitution. Upon this 
construction, the court declared that 
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section 44 of LUPO is […] manifestly inconsistent with the Constitution to the 
extent that it not only permits appeals to the province against every decision 
made by a municipality in terms of LUPO, but also because it allows first 
respondent to replace every decision with his own decision, even where the 
development in question patently affects only 'municipal planning'. It must, 
therefore, follow that by a conflation of the provincial and the municipal 
powers, LUPO, insofar as s 44 is concerned, is overbroad. It effectively guts 
the powers of a municipality which are relevant to municipal planning, and 
gives first respondent powers which would, therefore, be subversive of the 







 provincial governments' legislative competence over local 
government functional areas is limited by section 155(6)(a) and (7). In terms of this 
section, provincial government is empowered to, through legislative and other 
measures, monitor and support local government and to regulate the manner in which 
municipalities exercise their authority. The court, however, appears to have 
misunderstood the extent of the supervisory powers, noting instead that provincial 
government may "broadly manage or control the exercise by municipalities over their 
executive authority in relation to municipal planning."
276
 This nuanced 
misunderstanding then led the court to hold that 
 
provincial government may also assess the outcome of the municipal planning 
processes. Provincial government may require that the decision be 
reconsidered by a municipality if the manner in which it was taken, the 
justification for the decision, or the nature and effect or likely effect of 
the decision undermine the effective performance by the municipality of its 
forward planning and land use control functions. This constitutes an approach 
which harmonises the relationship between the two levels of government, 
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As is apparent from the above statement, the court took the view that provincial 
government was able to take an active regulatory role in assessing each decision of the 
local government which related to municipal planning. The court was thus able to hold 
that section 44 was unconstitutional because it allowed provincial government to 
review all decisions (and therefore would inevitably allow it to review decisions falling 
within the exclusive domain of the local government sphere) and as a result the 
provincial government was able to usurp the executive powers of local government by 
making decisions in respect of any appeal. The court therefore highlighted that the 
provincial government was legitimately entitled to hear appeals where these fell within 
the ambit of exercising its supervisory powers.  
 
In this regard, it is submitted that the court failed to consider the practical utility of the 
appeal body established in the LUPO. The utility of this appeal body should be to allow 
agreived parties (whether applicants or interested and affected parties) to appeal against 
decisions of local government realting to LUPO applications. The court appears to 
envisison a supervisory-review body in terms of which provinical government may 
adjudicate on whether or not the local government has made a decision that will 
undermine the effective performance of its functions. Considering that the majority of 
applicants lodging LUPO applications with the City of Cape Town would be private 
persons, it is difficult to understand how appeals to this supervisory-review body could 
be launched. The provincial government would not itself be an applicant (in respect of 
the original LUPO application), and would not usually be an interested or affected party 
(except where the development included inter-municipal issues). It would not be within 
the knowledge of private persons to allege that the municipality’s decision would 
undermine the effective performance of its functions. This is esentially a politcal issue. 
Thus, it would appear the provincial government would have to lodge such an appeal, 
and therefore act as both the appellant and appeal forum. Obviously, this situation 
would not be acceptable. Furthermore, issues relating on whether or not the provinical 
government had locus standi to launch such an appeal would have to be traversed. 
 
It is submitted that this supervisory-review body would also be contrary to the principle 
of co-operative governance. Instead, these essentailly political issues should be dealt 
with during the initial decision making process through a consultative processes. For 
these reasons, it is argued that an appeal body against administrative decisions of the 
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local government cannot be the correct forum in which provincial government 
exercises its supervisory powers. Thus, although the court correctly determined that 
section 44 was unconstitutional, it is submitted that the reasoning adopted by it is 
fundamentally flawed. If nothing else, this decision serves to highlight the potential for 
judicial interpretation to negatively impact of the clarity of the functional areas and 
highlights the importance of adopting alternative means of interpretation. 
6. ANALYSIS OF FUNCTIONAL AREAS 
6.1. Contribution by judicial interpretation 
As is evident from the cases discussed above, '[c]considerable overlap between the 
functional areas assigned to [provincial and local] spheres of government leads, in 
practice, to an overlap of powers and functions.'
278
 It is important at his stage to make a 
distinction between concurrency of powers and overlap of powers.  
 
Concurrency refers to the 'existence of the same powers over the same functional 
areas.'
279
 An example of concurrency of powers is where national and provincial 
government are allocated legislative competence of the areas listed at Part A of 
Schedule 4. Concurrency of powers is expressly provided for in terms of the 
Constitution and is 'intended'
280
 and prima facie permissible.  
 
Overlap, on the other hand, occurs where more than one sphere of government has 
administrative or legislative authority over the same functional area.
281
 Steytler et al 
note that the allocation of original powers to local government in terms of the 
Constitution results in at least two areas of overlap: supervisory overlap and overlap 
between functional areas.
282
 Whilst supervisory overlap is intended, overlap between 
functional areas as a consequence of the lack of clarity with which functional areas are 
listed is 'unintended although not unforeseen.'
283
 A consequence of 'minimalist' manner 
in which Schedule 4 and 5 have been drafted is that 'definitional problems and overlaps' 
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 These definitional problems fall into two categories. First, where the same 
functional areas are allocated to the national, provincial or local sphere of government, 
with the only distinction being the addition of either the 'provincial' or 'municipal' 
qualification (i.e. provincial planning/municipal planning).
285
 Second, where 'a 
provincial functional area includes or covers a local functional area.'
286
 Steytler et al 





In considering the implications of the national-provincial division of legislative powers, 
Bray notes that the term 'environment' has 'no fixed content' and suggests that its 
parameters will fall to be determined by the legislature and/or the Constitutional Court. 
Bray goes on to note that one of the sources of fragmentation that arise due to this is 
that provincial legislatures may take 'different views on what 'environment' means in 
the context of their province'. Bray goes on further to suggest that because functional 
areas such as, inter alia, soil conservation and nature conservation are recognized as 
separated areas from 'environment', that there is an implication that 'environment will 
be seen only in the context of the individual's basic right to the environment … a 
homocentric approach which centers around human health and well-being.'288 
 
The functional approach to interpretation adopted in the Liquor Bill case
289
 gives rise to 
the territorial principle and the need to determine what is appropriate for each sphere of 
government. How then does one go about determining what is appropriate to a sphere 
of government? De Visser argues that local government functions should be interpreted 
to reflect the constitutional principle of developmental local government.
290
 Therefore, 
so the argument goes, 'the competencies must enable local government to discharge its 
development-driven functions fully and effectively.'
291
 A general problem that arises 
where courts are required to determine issues relating to the scope of functional areas is 
that the dispute is often a political issue. Discussing the courts’ role in determining 
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disputes relating to legislative competence, Bronstein notes that '[t]he categorisation of 
legislation may raise challenging questions of statutory interpretation that force the 
Court to engage delicate political issues.'
292
 The court has been reluctant to use the 
constitutional mechanisms contained in the principle of co-operative governance to 
'impose judicial solutions on quintessentially political problems.'
293
 Therefore, courts 
should been seen as having a limited role in defining the boundaries of the functional 
areas and the manner in which the spheres of government are to co-operate. 
 
A further problem that exists, which is evident from the above cases discussed, is that 
the guidance provided by judicial interpretation is inadequate as it is couched in broad 
and general terms and has only been applied to relatively few functional areas.
294
 
Therefore, whilst providing crucial insight into the manner in which functional areas 
are to be interpreted, such guidance is limited.  
 
Therefore, alternative mechanism for clarifying the scope of functional areas should be 
considered. Steytler identifies three alternative means of interpreting the functional 
areas: legislative interpretation, administrative definitions, and negotiated definitions.
295
 
Interestingly, due to the fact that courts have approached defining functional areas in a 
bottom up manner, the legislative definition of 'environment' as contained in NEMA, 
has never been considered as being relevant. Prior to the judgments outlined above, 
Bosman noted that 'the competencies listed in Schedules 4 and 5, read with the 
definition of ‘environment’ in the National Environmental Management Act 107 of 
1998 […], could potentially lead to inconsistency in decision-making and even conflict 
among and between spheres of government that cannot be resolved with reference to 
the provisions on co-operative governance alone.'
296
 Whilst conflict has indeed arisen 
in the area of environment, it has never fallen to the court to consider what is meant by 
this term. Bosman et al argue that it is apparent from a consideration of Schedules 4 
and 5 that the definition of environment as contained in NEMA is not what the drafters 
of the Constitution had intended to allocate by including ‘environment’ as a functional 
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area listed in Schedule 4.
297
 This, it is argued, is because such a situation 'negates co-
operation, harmonization, and integration and actually leads to confusion and even 
conflict.'
298
 Bosman et al conclude by arguing that the 'Constitution will have to be 
amended to provide clarity not only on the role and responsibilities of the different 
spheres of government, but also within specific spheres.'
299
 However, as has been seen 
from the manner in which the courts have interpreted the functional areas that have 
given rise to conflict that creative interpretation can lead to results that are flexible and 
give effect to the principles of the Constitution. 
 
A further consideration when analysing the functional areas is to note that as a general 
rule, a municipal council 'is not compelled to legislate in any of its functional areas.'
300
 
It is therefore a discretionary power that vests in the municipal council, and thus the 
absence of local government laws should not be construed as meaning that local 
government is not entitled to legislate within such area. 
6.2. Legislative interpretation 
Legislatures in all three spheres of government are able to define the scope of 
functional areas through the enactment of laws. For example, a municipality passing a 
by-law has the effect of self-defining the scope of its powers within the functional area 
to which the by-law relates.
301
 Of course, the potential for individual municipalities to 
either be over- or under-inclusive to varying degrees is great. At a national level, we 
have already seen how the definition of 'environment' as set out in the National 
Environmental Management Act has not been considered when deciding on the 
functional area of municipal planning vis-à-vis environment. However, this is because 
the bottom-up method of defining functional areas has been adopted, which has 
resulted in courts not attempting to define what is meant by environment. 
 
An interesting example of a further national legislative definition is that of 'municipal 
health services' as contained in the Health Act:
302
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'municipal health services', for the purposes of this Act, includes- 
(a) water quality monitoring; 
(b) food control; 
(c) waste management; 
(d) health surveillance of premises; 
(e) surveillance and prevention of communicable diseases, excluding 
immunisations; 
(f) vector control; 
(g) environmental pollution control; 
(h) disposal of the dead; and 





It is evident that the scope of this definition is over inclusive in that there is seemingly 
great potential for overlap with the provincial competences of 'animal control and 
diseases', 'environment', and 'pollution control'.
304
 In addition, this definition also 
creates overlap between the assignment of local government powers between district 
and local municipalities in terms of the Municipal Structures Act.
305
 As noted by 
Steytler et al:  
 
this definition illustrates a further problem, namely the lack of uniformity in 
the approaches followed by the various national departments. Every national 
(and indeed provincial) department that deals with local government may have 
its own conception of how local government powers should be defined and 




The potential for conflict arising from un-coordinated legislative definitions was noted 
by Bray in analysing the Interim Constitution. Such analysis is equally applicable to the 
final Constitution. Discussing the scope of the functional area of 'environment' Bray 
noted that 'it is possible that provincial legislatures may have different views on what 
'environment' means in the context of their provinces.'
307
 Bray went on to suggest that 
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such lack of co-ordination will have a great effect on the 'implementation and 




An interesting example of legislative interpretation, which has arisen as a result of the 
judgment in the Gauteng Development Tribunal case, is contained in the Spatial 
Planning and Land Use Management Act ("SPLUMA").
309
 SPLUMA essentially seeks 
to address and regulate planning at a national, provincial and local level.  Although 
enacted, SPLUMA has yet to commence. The purpose of SPLUMA is to replace the 
pre-constitutional ordinances that are still in force and to ensure that constitutionally 
acceptable governance exists in the field of planning, particularly in respect of each 
spheres powers to exercise legislative and executive authority within this field. 
However, being national legislation, SPLUMA cannot intrude on the provincial or 
locals spheres' powers in respect of their competences relating to planning. To the 
extent that such intrusions may exist, SPLUMA would be unconstitutional and 
therefore unlawful. In order to overcome this, SPLUMA specifically provides that it is 
legislation enacted in terms of section 155(7) of the Constitution insofar as it regulates 
municipal planning and section 44(2) of the Constitution insofar as it regulates 
provincial planning.
310
 The position in respect of municipal planning will be set out. As 
stated above, section 155(7) of the Constitution provides the circumstances in which 
national government may legislate in respect of local government functional areas. 
Subsection (7) provides that 
 
[t]he national government, subject to section 44, and the provincial 
governments have the legislative and executive authority to see to the effective 
performance by municipalities of their functions in respect of matters listed in 
Schedules 4 and 5, by regulating the exercise by municipalities of their 




Prima facie, it appears that national government may only enact legislation that 
regulates the exercise by municipalities of their executive authority. However, 
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 the effect of section 44 read with section 155(7) of the 
Constitution appears to provide the national government with an unlimited 
power to legislate within the functional area of municipal planning (as well as 
any other matter listed in Schedule 4). In a legal opinion prepared for the 
Department of Rural Development and Land Reform by Advocates Gauntlett 
SC and Keightley in respect of the Spatial Planning and Land Use Management 
Bill,
313,314
 it was argued that national government has unlimited legislative 
powers in respect of Schedule 4 functional areas.
315
 Therefore, it would appear 
that SPLUMA cannot be challenged as being unconstitutional by virtue of being 
contrary to section 155(7) of the Constitution. However, SPLUMA must be 
scrutinised with regard to other relevant provisions of the Constitution, in order 
to ensure that the planning system that it creates is aligned with the division of 
powers in terms of the Constitution. This is where the legislative definitions of 
relevant functional areas play an important role. SPLUMA offers definitions for 




(1)     Municipal planning, for the purposes of this Act, consists of the 
following elements: 
(a)     The compilation, approval and review of integrated development plans; 
(b)     the compilation, approval and review of the components of an integrated 
development plan prescribed by legislation and falling within the competence 
of a municipality, including a spatial development framework and a land use 
scheme; and 
(c)     the control and regulation of the use of land within the municipal area 
where the nature, scale and intensity of the land use do not affect the provincial 
planning mandate of provincial government or the national interest. 
(2)     Provincial planning, for the purposes of this Act, consists of the 
following elements: 
(a)     The compilation, approval and review of a provincial spatial 
development framework; 
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(b)     monitoring compliance by municipalities with this Act and provincial 
legislation in relation to the preparation, approval, review and implementation 
of land use management systems; 
(c)     the planning by a province for the efficient and sustainable execution of 
its legislative and executive powers insofar as they relate to the development of 
land and the change of land use; and 





As can be seen, the definitions offered by SPLUMA do little to elucidate on the content 
of municipal planning, and essentially repeat what is already provided for in the 
Municipal Systems Act. Therefore, it does not appear that SPUMA has advanced the 
debate regarding the competence in respect of planning. However, the structures put 
into place by the operation of SPLUMA provide some legislative definition of the 
functional area of municipal planning. An example of this is that the appeal authority in 
respect of municipal planning decisions will fall within the local government sphere.
318 
This is in contrast to the various ordinances which have allowed for appeals to the 
provincial government. This emphasises the autonomy of local government in respect 
of municipal planning.  In addition, a potentially useful mechanism provided for in 
SPLUMA is the power for the Minister (i.e. national sphere) to publish norms and 
standards for land use management and land development after consultation with 
organs of state in the provincial and local spheres of government.
319
 This mechanism 
provides an opportunity for all spheres of government to negotiate and further define 
the content of the functional areas relating to planning. However, this efficacy of such 
mechanism will depend on the consultation process that it follows.  
 
Therefore, it is evident that legislative definitions , if uncoordinated, have the potential 
to muddy the waters even further, and create even greater conflict between the spheres 
of government (and even between the classes of local government). How then should 
the various legislative bodies ensure that legislative definitions do not create further 
opportunity for conflict? Steytler et al suggest that certain mechanisms should be used 
to mitigate for over or under inclusiveness: follow a process of consultation with 
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affected spheres of government (such process must be inclusive and must be used to 
formulate appropriate legislative definitions); use of standard by-laws to be adopted by 
local government.
320
 Thus, it is apparent that the principles of co-operative governance 
are important to ensuring that any legislative definitions are appropriate and ensure 
functional integrity and coherence.
321
 
6.3. Administrative definitions 
Administrative definitions, although helpful as guidelines have a key deficiency that 
cannot be overlooked: administrative definitions have no formal status and therefore 
cannot be binding on any sphere of government.
322
 The Municipal Demarcation Board 
produced a set of definitions for local government functional areas in 2005.
323
 Steytler 
notes that these definitions are deficient in a number of respects: key deficiencies 
include failing to define functional areas in light of local governments objectives as set 
out in section 152 of the Constitution, failing to define what is meant by the qualifiers 
'local' and 'municipal' as they appear in the Schedules; being inconsistent in the manner 
in which functional areas are defined (in some case definitions relate to a range of 




It is suggested, however, that administrative definitions prepared by the Minister 
responsible for local government could provide a 'coherent overarching view of the 
nature and ambit of local government powers and functions.'
325
 Such definition could 
be useful as a tool to: 
 
(a) [...] give municipalities guidance in determining the ambit of their powers 
and functions. This will be of great relevance to the drafting of by-laws and the 
structuring of the executive authority, including the drafting of Integrated 
Development Plans. 
(b) [...] guide national and provincial departments in drafting statutory 
definitions of powers and functions concerned with a particular sector of 
government. 
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(c) [...] guide provincial governments in defining the scope of their monitoring 
and support functions with regard to municipalities. 
 
In addition, a set of administrative definitions of this type would be a useful tool in 
assisting courts to decide upon matters arising from conflict due to alleged unlawful 
overlap of functional areas. These definitions, if appropriately formulated, would 
therefore facilitate co-ordinated conflict resolution and governance. In the absence of 
such administrative definitions, it is suggested that inconsistencies relating to the scope 
of functional areas are likely to occur which will result in an uncoordinated approach to 
local government.
326
 Thus, from a purely practical level, environmental governance 
would be best served through coordinated administrative definitions of key functional 
areas. 
6.4. Negotiated definitions  
Negotiated definitions should be seen as a tool to implement the Constitutional 
requirement that all spheres of government and all organs of state within each sphere 
must  co-operate with one another in mutual trust and good faith by co-ordinating their 
actions and legislation with one another.327 The Constitution requires that all political 
means of resolving disputes between organs of state or spheres of government must be 
exhausted before turning to the courts to resolve such dispute.
328
 Seen in this light, the 
implementation of powers and functions could be agreed upon between different 
spheres of government.329 The forum for negotiating definitions of functional areas may 
take various forms. The KwaZulu-Natal Tourism Act330 provides an example of a 
forum in terms of which negotiated definitions of the scope of functional areas between 
the province and the municipalities within that province can be agreed.331 In terms of 
this Act, the aim of the intergovernmental forum is to, inter alia, facilitate co-operation 
between the province and municipalities,332 and to promote efficiency by eliminating 
duplication of tourism functions and activities in the Province.333 Thus, through 
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intergovernmental fora/forums such as the above, it is possible to negotiate the scope of 
powers to be administered by each sphere of government. However, the obvious 
drawback of such forums is that the negotiated definitions may be contrary to the 
constitutional allocation, and may result in a lack of co-ordination between different 
forums. Therefore, negotiated definitions should be utilised in conjunction with 




7. THE ROLE OF CO-OPERATIVE GOVERNANCE 
7.1. Introduction 
Clearly, the Constitution enhanced the status of local government from that of its pre-
constitutional status.334 De Visser et al note that because of the constitutional reality 
that three spheres of government share one space in which to execute their assigned 
planning functions, all spheres of government need to embrace a cooperative 
approach.335 However, the principle of co-operative governance is a relatively new idea 
that was only introduced by the Constitution. Woolman and Roux note that prior to the 
Constitution, although there were different levels of government, co-operative 
government was a foreign idea as 'all meaningful decision –making processes were 




Any consideration of the allocation of powers amongst the three spheres of government 
must take cognisance of the constitutional principle of co-operative governance. 
Specially, the concept of co-operative environmental governance will be examined. In 
the context of environmental law, all three spheres of government have an 
environmental responsibility which means that the principle of co-operative governance 
is important to ensuring effective environmental governance.
337
 As has been indicated 
from the case discussions above, local government is mandated to promote a safe and 
healthy environment. 
 
Co-operative governance is enshrined as one of the fundamental principles set out in 
the Constitution. Section 41(1) provides that 
 
All spheres of government and all organs of state within each sphere must - 
[…] 
(e)     respect the constitutional status, institutions, powers and functions of 
government in the other spheres;  
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(f)     not assume any power or function except those conferred on them in 
terms of the Constitution;  
(g)     exercise their powers and perform their functions in a manner that does 
not encroach on the geographical, functional or institutional integrity of 
government in another sphere; and 
(h)     co-operate with one another in mutual trust and good faith by - 
(i)      fostering friendly relations; 
(ii)     assisting and supporting one another; 
(iii)    informing one another of, and consulting one another on, matters 
of common interest;  
(iv)    co-ordinating their actions and legislation with one another;  
(v)     adhering to agreed procedures; and 




It has been suggested that the fact that the Constitution specifically provides for the 
principle of co-operation 'pre-empts sharing of the same responsibilities by different 
spheres of government.'
339
 As noted by Freedman, '[g]iven that there is large overlap 
between the legislative and executive authority of the national, provincial and local 
spheres of government, it is not surprising that the Constitution, makes provision for a 
system of co-operative government'.340 The importance of co-operative governance is a 
crucial element of the South African governmental structure, which is particularly 
important in respect of the functional areas which relate to environmental issues (both 
directly and indirectly). '[E]ach sphere of government exists as a distinctive body with 
its own unique character, but functions on the basis of interdependence and 




However, the constitutional principles of co-operative governance 'are not meant to 
diminish the power of one organ of state at the expense of another. Rather, it 
presupposes and emphasises the willingness by all spheres of government to work 
together.'
342
 Woolman & Roux summarise the Constitutional Court's Chapter 3 
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jurisprudence as confirming that co-operative governance is governed by two basic 
principles: 
First, one sphere of government or one organ of state may not use its powers in 
such a way as to undermine the effective functioning of another sphere of 
organ of state. Second, the actual integrity of each sphere of government and 





In addition, it should be noted that the Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act 
('IRFA')344
 
was promulgated to create a framework for the national government, 
provincial governments and local governments to promote and facilitate 
intergovernmental relations, as well as to provide for mechanisms and procedures to 
facilitate the settlement of intergovernmental disputes.345 The aim of the Act is to 
provide an institutional framework for the different spheres of government to facilitate 
coherent government, co-ordination in the implementation and monitoring of policy 
and legislation, effective provision of services and the realisation of national priorities. 
In terms of section 9 of the IRFA, a Cabinet member may establish a national 
intergovernmental forum to promote and facilitate intergovernmental relations in the 
functional area for which that Cabinet member is responsible. Similar forums may be 
established to coordinate provincial-local relations.
346
 Van Wyk, referring specifically 
to planning, but which has equal relevance to the field of the environment, notes that 
'[i]n the face of the varied functional areas that play a role in planning [...] the challenge 




7.2. Beyond planning 
From an environmental perspective planning has been a fertile area of functional 
conflict. This is because 'decisions concerning land-use lie at the heart of many 
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 It is evident that municipal planning has been the catalyst for 
disputes arising out of the functional areas. One could suggest that this is because 
planning is in itself a field that is so broad that it includes by implication various of the 
other functional areas. Yacoob J articulated this notion in the minority judgment in the 
Wary Holdings case, stating that '[p]lanning entails land use and is inextricably 
connected to every functional area that concerns the use of land. There is probably not a 
single functional area in the Constitution that can be carried out without land.'349
 
Due to 
the fact that planning has given rise to a plethora of functional area conflicts, it is 
important to consider whether the manner in which such conflicts have been dealt with 
can be applied to conflicts arising between other functional areas. 
 
It is submitted that the methodologies used by the courts to interpret the functional 
areas is applicable to all functional areas. Of course, each instance of overlap will have 
to be considered, and a decision reached on a case by case basis. However the basic 
principles, such as the functional approach and a bottom-up interpretation will be 
equally applicable to determining the scope of conflicting functional areas. 
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8. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Whilst the Constitution represented a significant leap in providing mechanisms for 
effective environmental governance, such as through the incorporation of an 
environmental right, opening up standing to enforce such a right in the courts of South 
Africa, and guaranteeing just administrative action,
350
 the complexity with which it has 
established a multi-sphere government has led to a lack of clarity regarding the powers 
of each sphere to govern environment-related matters. From the above analysis it is 
clear that the constitutional allocation of competences to the three spheres of 
government is unclear and contradictory. Whilst it does not appear that the drafters of 
the Constitution intended to list the functional areas in a manner that completely 
avoided overlap, the Constitution protects local government's autonomy in a number of 
ways, and therefore, any intrusion into its competence is unconstitutional and unlawful. 
Thus, overlap, although catered for, cannot be permitted. Mettler notes that 
 
the ability of local government to govern in a particular functional area is a 
product of its own legislative authority as circumscribed by the legislative 





However, barring any highly unlikely and radical amendment of the Constitution, the 
functional vision of the drafters is here to stay. Thus, it is necessary to define the scope 
of the functional areas to avoid conflict arising between the different spheres of 
government.  
 
Although there are various mechanisms available in terms of which functional areas 
can be defined, there has been a lack of real progress in this regard. It has therefore 
largely fallen to the courts to interpret the functional areas in response to specific 
instances of conflict that have arisen. In terms of environmental issues, the bulk of 
judicial interpretation has been within the context of municipal planning. Whilst 
intrinsically limited, judicial interpretation has produced clear principles to be applied 
in defining the scope of functional areas allocated in terms of the Constitution. Key are 
the theories of giving effect to the functional vision of the Constitution, and the 
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principle of subsidiarity which informs the bottom-up approach to interpretation. 
However, as seen in the Le Sueur and Habitat Council cases, judicial principles may be 
misconstrued and result in unacceptable precedents being set. In addition, it has been 
shown that despite the Constitution being in force since 1997, instances of judicial 
interpretation are relatively rare, and of more concern, the principles that have arisen 
are legally complex, and often difficult to apply in practice. This is evident in that even 
lower courts are at pains to consistently apply the precedent of higher courts. It is 
therefore impractical to suggest that each municipality, each province, and the national 
government (as well as all organs of state) will apply such principles in a uniform 
matter. Therefore, whilst judicial interpretation is important, it is a reactive response to 
conflict, and therefore does not assist is dealing with the cause of the problem. It would 
be of more benefit to engage in alternative means of providing content to the meaning 
of the functional areas, thus reducing the amount of conflict and therefore reducing the 
involvement of the judiciary.  
 
Thus, administrative, negotiated and legislative definitions should be adopted at local 
government level to inform the content of local governments’ competences. However, 
as has been shown from the above discussion, each of these alternatives cannot be 
applied in isolation, as each has its own inherent flaws. This then raises the question of 
whether or not greater clarity and consistency in respect of the interpretation of 
functional areas is an achievable goal? It is submitted that this goal is in theory an 
achievable one. This is because the Constitution has provided mechanisms for the 
functional areas to be defined, whether through co-operative governance, enactment of 
national legislation, or exercising supervisory powers over local government. These 
mechanisms allow for legislation to assist in defining the limits of functional areas, for 
spheres of government and organs of state to negotiate definitions, and for the adopting 
of administrative definitions. However, from a practical perspective, it is unlikely that 
conflict can be avoided all together. This it is submitted is due to a number of reasons 
that are uncontrollable. Such reasons include the fact that governance is ultimately a 
political monster where conflict cannot (and rightly should not) be avoided. Also, the 
divergent concerns and capacities of municipalities through South Africa would give 
rise to divergent ideas of what powers local government can exercise. Whilst these 
problems can be addressed to some extent through negotiation and co-operation, the 
outcome of such processes is ultimately compromised by all or some stakeholders. 
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Thus, whilst greater consistency and clarity may be achieved, it is unlikely that conflict 
can be avoided. In addition, as the Constitution is supreme, it is likely that any 
legislative, administrative and negotiated tools would inevitably be challenged in court 
as being unconstitutional. However, by engaging in alternative means of defining the 
functional areas, the instances of conflict can be greatly reduced and courts will be in a 





Functional areas of concurrent national and provincial legislative competence 
PART A 
Administration of indigenous forests 
Agriculture 
Airports other than international and national airports 
Animal control and diseases 
Casinos, racing, gambling and wagering, excluding 








Indigenous law and customary law, subject to Chapter 
12 of the Constitution 
Industrial promotion 
Language policy and the regulation of official 
languages to the extent that the provisions of section 6 
of the Constitution expressly confer upon the provincial 
legislatures legislative competence 
Media services directly controlled or provided by the 
provincial government, subject to section 192 
Nature conservation, excluding national parks, national 
botanical gardens and marine resources 
Police to the extent that the provisions of Chapter 11 of 




Property transfer fees 
Provincial public enterprises in respect of the functional 
areas in this Schedule and Schedule 5 
PART B 
The following local government matters to the extent set 
out in section 155(6)(a) and (7): 
Air pollution 
Building regulations 
Child care facilities 





Municipal health services 
Municipal public transport 
Municipal public works only in respect of the needs of 
municipalities in the discharge of their responsibilities to 
administer functions specifically assigned to them under 
this Constitution or any other law 
Pontoons, ferries, jetties, piers and harbours, excluding 
the regulation of international and national shipping and 
matters related thereto 
Stormwater management systems in built-up areas 
Trading regulations 
Water and sanitation services limited to potable water 





Public works only in respect of the needs of provincial 
government departments in the discharge of their 
responsibilities to administer functions specifically 
assigned to them in terms of the Constitution or any 
other law 
Regional planning and development 




Traditional leadership, subject to Chapter 12 of the 
Constitution 









Archives other than national archives 
Libraries other than national libraries 
Liquor licences 
Museums other than national museums 
Provincial planning 
Provincial cultural matters 
Provincial recreation and amenities 
Provincial sport 
Provincial roads and traffic 





The following local government matters to the extent set 
out for provinces in section 155(6)(a) and (7): 
Beaches and amusement facilities 
Billboards and the display of advertisements in public 
places 
Cemeteries, funeral parlours and crematoria 
Cleansing 
Control of public nuisances 
Control of undertakings that sell liquor to the public 
Facilities for the accommodation, care and burial of 
animals 
Fencing and fences 
Licensing of dogs 





Local sport facilities 
Markets 
Municipal abattoirs 














District municipality functions and powers in terms of section 84(1) of the Local 
Government: Municipal Structures Act 117 of 1998, as amended. 
 
 Integrated development planning for the district municipality as a whole, including 
a framework for integrated development plans of all municipalities in the area of 
the district municipality. 
 Potable water supply systems. 
 Bulk supply of electricity, which includes for the purposes of such supply, the 
transmission, distribution and, where applicable, the generation of electricity. 
 Domestic waste-water and sewage disposal systems. 
 Solid waste disposal sites, in so far as it relates to - 
o the determination of a waste disposal strategy; 
o the regulation of waste disposal; 
o the establishment, operation and control of waste disposal sites, bulk waste 
transfer facilities and waste disposal facilities for more than one local 
municipality in the district. 
 Municipal roads which form an integral part of a road transport system for the area 
of the district municipality as a whole. 
 Regulation of passenger transport services. 
 Municipal airports serving the area of the district municipality as a whole. 
 Municipal health services. 
 Fire fighting services serving the area of the district municipality as a whole, which 
includes - 
o planning, co-ordination and regulation of fire services; 
o specialised fire fighting services such as mountain, veld and chemical fire 
services; 
o co-ordination of the standardisation of infrastructure, vehicles, equipment 
and procedures; 
o training of fire officers. 
 The establishment conduct and control of fresh produce markets and abattoirs 
serving the area of a major proportion of the municipalities in the district. 
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 The establishment conduct and control of cemeteries and crematoria serving the 
area of a major proportion of municipalities in the district. 
 Promotion of local tourism for the area of the district municipality. 
 Municipal public works relating to any of the above functions or any other 
functions assigned to the district municipality. 
 The receipt, allocation and, if applicable, the distribution of grants made to the 
district municipality. 
 The imposition and collection of taxes, levies and duties as related to the above 
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